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The Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise at the University of Maryland’s School of 
Public Policy provides the strategic linkage between the public and private sector to develop and 
improve solutions to increasingly complex problems associated with the delivery of public 
services—a responsibility increasingly shared by both sectors. Operating at the nexus of public 
and private interests, the Center researches, develops, and promotes best practices; develops 
policy recommendations; and strives to influence senior decision-makers toward improved 
government and industry results.  
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The DoD’s ability to exclusively rely on a defense-unique industrial base is rapidly coming to an 
end.  While the potential ramifications of this unfolding reality have been debated since the 1986 
Packard Commission, the business processes of the acquisition bureaucracy have not reflected 
nor adequately addressed this radical change in circumstances. The DoD has a choice.  It can 
continue to use its declining budget to replicate advances already made in the commercial 
marketplace at a significant cost both from a budgetary and lost innovation perspective.  Or it 
can embrace that market and implement policies and business practices that support the goal of 
achieving what then Under Secretary of Defense Kaminski described in 1995: “The military 
advantage goes to the nation who has the best cycle time to capture technologies that are 
commercially available; incorporate them in weapon systems; and get them fielded first.”  
 
At one time, the federal government and the DoD dominated research and development (R&D) 
spending. For example, in 1964, the federal government provided 67% of R&D funding and 
served as the driver of innovation in the economy. Today, the private sector provides over 60% 
of U.S. R&D funding and accounts for over 70% of its performance advances.  As the trend 
toward private sector R&D intensified in the 1980s and 1990s, defense policy-makers began to 
focus on how to access this emerging commercial source of innovation, especially as commercial 
products began to prove cheaper and, often, more reliable.  The result was a monumental 
acquisition reform effort in the early 1990s that paved the way for the incorporation of these 
commercial technologies and business practices into DoD systems.  The introduction of 
commercial advances from the information technology industry enabled the 1990s net-centric 
revolution in military affairs and military advances to be on the cusp of an unmanned vehicle and 
robotics revolution that is based on many of these same commercial technologies. 
 
Despite these efforts and the many other successful transitions of commercial technologies into 
DoD systems, many commercial, non-traditional contractors who are at the cutting edge of 
technological research and product creation still do not see the DoD as an attractive marketplace. 
Commercial item acquisition reforms of the 1990s never went as far as they should have to truly 
integrate the commercial marketplace into the DoD’s acquisition planning and implementation, 
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and in the last five to seven years, the acquisition environment at the DoD for non-traditional 
commercial contractors has eroded significantly.  
 
There is a widespread belief in industry that the entire paradigm for commercial contracting is 
under threat from within the Department of Defense.  Until that is addressed, further commercial 
reforms will not be successful.  While the auditing and contracting communities received most of 
the criticism for this change in environment, there were also concerns raised about the DoD’s 
technical requirements and security communities. However, the biggest dissatisfactions were 
leveled against the senior leadership of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services, 
who some respondents believed didn’t have a clear understanding of the relationship between the 
defense acquisition system and the global industrial base, and have not provided the support and 
backing for the acquisition of commercial items.  In the absence of leadership advocacy and 
guidance, there is a belief that a whole-scale overturning of the acquisition reforms of the 1990s 
is being allowed to take place. 
 
The openness of the defense market to commercial goods and services has declined significantly.  
In the last five years, the DoD has seen a return of a culture of risk aversion and adversarial 
business relations with industry.  This culture has been allowed to re-assert itself due to 
leadership signals from both Congress and the executive branch.  As a result, financial, 
intellectual property, and market risks have grown for commercial companies doing business 
with the DoD, while procurement, security, and oversight barriers have all risen.   
 
Successful tools to access commercial contractors have been seriously undermined by statute, 
regulation, or practice. Several tools have been successful in encouraging non-traditional 
commercial contractors’ participation in DoD acquisitions, and in return, allowing the DoD 
access to the contractors’ technologies and expertise. These tools are market research, 
commercial item (Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR] Part 12) contracting, Other 
Transactions Authority (OTA), rapid acquisition authorities, and the use of intermediaries—
primes, large subsystems contractors, and resellers (although this last tool has its own costs).  
Regrettably, all of these methods are currently either under threat or underutilized in the current 
acquisition environment.  
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Still, a return to the acquisition policies that were tried in the 1990s will not be enough to halt the 
DoD’s slide back to an increasingly unaffordable defense-unique industrial base that is 
challenged to incorporate new commercial technological developments.  This is because 
commercial markets have not remained static in the last 20 years and the nature of these markets 
is changing.  In the last 20 years, the relative significance of the U.S. global share of R&D has 
continued to decline. U.S. government R&D now equals about 11% of global R&D, and U.S. 
private sector R&D is about 17% of global R&D.  Global commercial R&D is rising, and more 
commercial technologies are now being developed overseas and available to all countries, both 
friend and potential foe.  While support for commercial item acquisition may have waned in the 
DoD during an era of expanding budgets, the rationale for taking advantage of an even larger 
share of commercial R&D is now greater than it was when acquisition reforms were first 
initiated in the 1990s, particularly as defense budgets decline.  However, the issue is now more 
complicated than it was, given the global nature of commercial R&D, and security issues will 
become more prominent as barriers. 
 
While a few commercial firms have left (or never entered) the defense market, many commercial 
firms are considering adjusting their structure in order to do business with the DoD and the U.S. 
government. A large segment of commercial firms are already organized to either sell only 
through government-unique intermediaries or have created government-unique subsidiaries that 
are more reflective of traditional defense contractors in cost structure and innovation.  The DoD 
is currently obtaining adequate (although possibly not the best) commercial technology that it 
asks for primarily through intermediaries, but at a higher cost.  The DoD risks falling behind 
technologically in the future, as commercial companies refuse to 1) modify their commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) products to avoid complying with government-unique oversight requirements; 
2) share their intellectual property with the government for fear of having it released; or 3) invest 
in cutting edge R&D in the United States but rather move this investment overseas to avoid the 
reach of U.S. export controls and security requirements. 
  
If the DoD is to continue to access the benefits of the commercial marketplace, the following 
recommendations should be considered.  Senior leadership in the Department of Defense needs 
to aggressively advocate for the acquisition of commercial technology and the adoption and 
 viii 
integration of commercial business practices.  This effort will require a long-term commitment, 
extending over several administrations.  A successful advocacy plan would include the following 
actions:  
1) Combat instances of requirements “gold-plating”—a process that continues to support the 
establishment and maintenance of military-unique requirements, standards, and practices.   
2) Re-establish incentives to effectively and robustly use existing authorities to access 
commercial firms for more than just COTS solutions. 
3) Ensure that DoD rapid acquisition organizations and capabilities are maintained and fully 
utilized, as a means to field solutions (especially commercial ones) faster.   
4) Identify and implement best commercial acquisition practices (by commercial sector and 
DoD application) throughout the DoD enterprise.  Focus audit agency oversight efforts 
on benchmarking these governmental and private sector “best commercial acquisition 
practices.” 
5) Encourage the establishment of non-traditional commercial entities in private sector firms 
that are exempt from unique government and DoD rules and oversight.  
6) Expand the use of Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements within existing 
authority, and seek legislation, if necessary, to better use OTA authority for limited 
production, and to access non-traditional commercial subcontractors under a FAR Part 15 
contract with a traditional defense prime contractor.   
7) Improve market research in the Department and the services to better understand which 
commercial capabilities are available in the market.   
8) Plan for a path to commerciality for non-traditional contractors when initially leveraging 
the commercial market for DoD requirements.  
9) Establish a new “Section 800” panel to recommend specific legislative, regulatory, and 
policy changes that remove the inhibitions to the acquisition of commercial items. This 
new effort should especially review the implications of the globalization of R&D and the 
commercial supply chain to the DoD’s ability to acquire this technology. 
10) Periodically benchmark the costs of compliance with government and military-unique 
requirements, laws, regulations, practices, certifications, and standards. 
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I. Introduction and Methodology 
There are many benefits to the federal government when commercial products can be used to 
meet requirements that include access to the latest technology, faster delivery, lower prices, 
integration of the defense and commercial industrial bases, access to commercial support 
services, and elimination of the need to fund the development and support of unique items.  In 
recognition of these, Congress enacted the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) in 
1994, establishing a preference for commercial-sector goods over specially produced ones, as 
long as the government’s needs were not compromised.  It was one of many initiatives enacted in 
the 1990s designed to entice new commercial entrants into the federal marketplace, especially at 
the Department of Defense (DoD), and was generally hailed by both industry and government 
leaders. 
The use of commercial contracting practices allowed commercial companies to enter the 
government marketplace and provide products to both commercial and military customers, using 
common product lines and workforces.  Internal investments to develop commercial products 
benefitted both commercial and military customers and created a larger production base with 
lower prices, due to economies of scale. The research and development for these products was 
paid for by these commercial companies, which freed up funding for the DoD to pursue other 
priorities. 
In recent years, however, questions have been raised by industry and outside observers as to 
whether the process for the government’s acquisition of goods and services from the commercial 
market has been destabilized and sub-optimized.  Legislative and regulatory changes have 
potentially undermined FASA’s reforms by imposing new government-unique acquisition 
oversight requirements that are inconsistent with commercial practices and threaten the 
commercial acquisition model.  Additionally, there have been concerns raised by industry that 
DoD procurement officials have chosen to ignore the preference for the commercial contracting 
model by unilaterally resurrecting requirements that had been abandoned by, for example, 
requiring unneeded cost data for commercial items, or falling back to military-unique 
specifications. In addition, the globalization of the commercial supply chain has presented new 
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challenges to the incorporation of commercial items, a concept not fully appreciated two decades 
ago.  
A steady erosion of the government’s use of the streamlined approach to commercial acquisition 
is a cause for concern, incurring both monetary and innovation costs.  “Regulatory creep,” in the 
form of additional government-unique requirements, negatively impacts the government’s ability 
to obtain the latest commercial technologies and services at the lowest possible prices.  This 
regulatory creep, if left unchecked, could cause many current and potential suppliers of 
commercial items to withdraw from the government marketplace.  Alternatively, excessive 
regulation could cause suppliers to re-establish separate government and commercial accounting, 
engineering, and production organizations at a substantial additional cost to the government.  
If the DoD were to adopt additional policies that had the effect of limiting the ability of 
commercial companies to fulfill requirements with commercial technologies on major defense 
programs, the implications would be significant.  The cost of these programs to the government 
would likely increase.  Government and company independent research and development 
(IR&D) investments in technology improvements necessary for the DoD to maintain its 
technological dominance would be marginalized as more of this investment would be needed to 
be spent on duplicating what is already in the commercial marketplace, rather than investing in 
new technologies.  This is a lose–lose situation for the DoD and the industrial base.  
The focus of the current research was to explore these issues by assessing the status of past DoD 
acquisition reforms designed to access commercial technologies and services and determine 
current trends in commercial acquisitions with non-traditional, commercial contractors.  The 
Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise at the University of Maryland collected and 
analyzed reports, journals, articles, policies, and regulations, and other information sources from 
the DoD and the military services, as well as from commercial-sector associations and 
corporations. Additionally, the Center study team interviewed current and former DoD officials 
and representatives from the commercial sector and financial community.  Lessons learned and 
persistent barriers to the participation of non-traditional commercial contractors were identified, 
and methods to overcome these barriers were defined. 
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The commercial firms selected for review and interview were identified from sectors that are 
important to the DoD.  This was done by interviewing experts in the field; reviewing commercial 
R&D expenditures, technology leadership, and market share; and comparing this data with DoD 
spending requirements, current programs, and available information on the DoD’s science and 
technology priorities. Both mature and emerging companies that may be leading candidates for 
developing future dual-use, defense-related technologies were identified.  This is a subjective 
exercise and will continue to change, based on advances in the commercial sector and national 
security requirements.  Company interviews were primarily limited by a firm’s availability, time 
constraints, and willingness to participate in the study.  In addition to interviewing a number of 
these firms, the study team attempted to maximize participation by working with some of the 
leading industry associations that collectively represented thousands of companies. Based on the 
interviews and data collected, various typologies and sectors of commercial firms were assessed 
to determine the degree that current policies, laws, practices, and regulations have encouraged or 
discouraged their participation in the defense market.  
The key questions that the study tried to answer were the following: 
• What commercial firms are (or could be) important in providing military solutions to 
the DoD?	  
• Do these firms choose to participate in the DoD marketplace? If so, in what manner?	  
• What level of technology is the DoD acquiring from leading commercial technology 
providers compared to other customers? 	  
• Has the DoD acquisition environment improved in the last five years to attract 
commercial firms to participate in DoD contracting? 	  
• Why do commercial firms choose not to participate in DoD contracting activities? 	  
• What laws, rules, regulations, policies, and practices have successfully encouraged 
participation by commercial firms in the defense market?	  
One of the biggest challenges to this research was the individual firms’ concerns about how their 
responses would be treated. Firms did not want to be identified by name and were very 
concerned about how the study team would use the information the firms provided. This concern 
extended even to the commercial contractors who did little business with the DoD. There appear 
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to be several major reasons for this concern.  One was the hesitancy of firms to publically outline 
information and strategies that could potentially be used against them by their competitors.  A 
second reason was just good business and public relations—there is no upside to publically 
criticizing a potential customer, no matter how remote the chances that you might actually sell to 
them. The third, more disconcerting and widespread reason, was the fear of retaliation by DoD 
acquisition and oversight officials. As one industry official stated, “Rarely has any good ever 
come to our firm by telling our customer he or she is wrong.”1  
As a result of the concerns by industry, this report does not identify the companies interviewed, 
and the study group allowed firms to provide information on a non-attribution basis. This 
allowed for a free discussion of specific issues within the DoD acquisition process.  As a result, 
references to individual companies in this report are based on publically available data sources 
rather than interviews.  We also relied on industry associations and outside experts to filter 
industry views.  Many firms rely on associations to articulate common positions and provide 
some distance from the DoD customer, and therefore escape any negative reactions to their 
specific companies.  However, in some associations, even this common position tends to be 
nuanced to avoid antagonizing the customer.   
This study is a brief snapshot of the general environment that commercial companies encounter 
when participating in the DoD marketplace.  While the study authors are satisfied that this paper 
identifies the most significant policy issues with commercial acquisition, we will continue to 
conduct industry interviews and surveys through the winter of 2014 to validate current 
conclusions and recommendations.    
This report begins with a short history of the U.S. military’s use of commercial contracting and 
outlines the case for, and the results of, the acquisition reforms of the 1990s.  Section III 
discusses research and development trends and potential commercial technologies that may be 
important to the DoD in the future.  Section IV explores the establishment of a typology of 
1 Interview with study authors. 
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traditional, non-traditional, commercial, and military-unique contractors.  Section V discusses 
barriers to the use of non-traditional commercial contractors, and Section VI identifies tools that 
the DoD has found to be successful in accessing these companies.  The final section lists 
conclusions and recommendations.  
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II. History of the U.S. Military’s Use of Commercial Contracting 
Since the Revolutionary War, the commercial industrial base and economic capacity in the 
United States has been important to, and relied upon by, the U.S. military.  The U.S. Navy’s first 
six frigates authorized in 1794 (the first large-scale weapons platform purchase by the U.S. 
government) were built in those shipbuilding communities that were producing commercial 
merchant ships.  The Civil War necessitated the mobilization of industrial and commercial 
capacity on both sides of the conflict.  An unfortunate upshot was the number of procurement 
scandals that ultimately led to the passage of the False Claims Act in 1863.  Many of the same 
“waste, fraud and abuse” issues faced during the Civil War—related to product substitution, 
quality, and potential overcharging—were issues still plaguing acquisition officials during recent 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011). 
Prior to World War I, responsibility for sustaining the defense industrial base fell for the most 
part to a few government-owned arsenals and facilities.  During World War I, a private defense 
industry (including a nascent aircraft industry) began to develop, but did not ramp up production 
in time to make a major difference in the war.  With the armistice, contracts were canceled and 
the industry evaporated.  The fledgling airline and aircraft industry was kept alive due to U.S. 
government airmail contracts—not military contracts.  
As World War II began, U.S. commercial industry converted to military applications and served 
as the “Arsenal of Democracy” and a foundation for the U.S. victory.  After demobilization in 
1945, commercial industry reverted to providing consumer goods to meet growing demand. The 
new machine tools and infrastructure purchased to support the war effort provided the means by 
which the U.S. maintained economic dominance and competitiveness for decades.2  The need to 
mobilize the commercial economy again at the beginning of the Cold War sparked Congress and 
the Truman administration to re-establish the link to the commercial market through the 
enactment of the Defense Production Act of 1950.  The resulting establishment of the Defense 
Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS) ensured that the U.S. government had access to civilian 
                                                
2 One of the more interesting findings found in Arthur Herman’s 2012 book Freedom’s Forge was the realization by Willliam Knudson (former 
president of General Motors) and those managing the industrial base conversion to defense work, that re-tooling U.S. industry “was more than 
just rearmament” but “a way to revitalize American business and industry” (p. 112) in anticipation of the post-war environment. 
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production to support the Korean War effort and future defense needs.  This DPAS authority 
continues to be relevant today and was heavily used to ensure that commercial companies would 
prioritize and support the production of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) equipment 
and Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected MRAP) vehicles during the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, 2007). 
President Eisenhower’s New Look policy set the stage for both the blossoming of a unique 
defense industrial base and the creation of new civilian commercial sectors in electronics, space, 
and computing.  Defense research of the period led to many of the technological advancements 
that still serve as the basis for U.S. military might—Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 
nuclear powered submarines, advanced bombers, reconnaissance satellites, and the electronics 
and communications technology that support these major platforms.  During the 1950s, the DoD 
provided a “path to commercialization” for a number of potential dual-use technologies (i.e., by 
serving as the lead customer for microelectronics purchases and for the Boeing 707 that served 
as the KC-135 tanker still in operation today).  These purchases allowed companies to build up 
necessary capital and successfully demonstrate technology in order to expand in the commercial 
marketplace.  The NASA manned moon landing program in the 1960s served as another 
mechanism to transfer technology to the commercial sector. 
In the early 1960s, concerns about cost overruns on many of these newly developed and 
produced military programs ushered in a new management and oversight approach, to include 
the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), a formal systems acquisition 
process, and the Truth in Negotiations Act of 1962 (TINA).  The Vietnam War era saw the 
beginning of the bifurcation of the civilian and military industry bases and the development of 
barriers to commercial firms’ participation in the DoD market. These barriers included the 
development of unique government procurement and oversight requirements, greater government 
control of intellectual property, unique security requirements, greater export controls, and a bias 
from the Pentagon against the use of commercial products.  The latter was reinforced by the 
extraordinary technologies developed in the defense sector and the relative technological 
weaknesses of the commercial sector at the time.  The result was a proliferation of unique 
military specifications. 
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For several decades, these two markets (military-unique and commercial) existed side by side 
with relatively little interaction.  The defense industrial base supported the maintenance and 
evolutionary improvement of earlier weapon systems complemented by a few revolutionary, 
military-unique technological breakthroughs in the 1970s, such as stealth.  Freed from its earlier 
military-centric and NASA-centric dependence, the computer and electronics industries began to 
develop technologies in innovative ways, as directed by the competitive pressures of the 
commercial market and the progression of Moore’s Law.3 
In 1980, aggregate commercially funded R&D in the United States overtook government-funded 
R&D and did not look back (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2013).  As 
this trend in private sector R&D intensified in the 1980s, defense policy-makers began to focus 
on ways to access this emerging source of innovation, especially as commercial products—from 
guardrails to TV monitors, data processors, and semiconductors—began to prove cheaper and 
more reliable than their military counterparts. For example, the Packard Commission found that 
commercial semiconductors were approximately an order of magnitude less expensive, were 
approximately two orders of magnitude more reliable, and were developed in less than 12 
months, compared to the 17–51 month lead-time for military-unique components. 
In 1986, President Ronald Reagan created the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management, chaired by David Packard, a co-founder of electronics giant Hewlett Packard and 
former Deputy Secretary of Defense.  While the stated goal of the Packard Commission was to 
identify methods to reduce inefficiencies in the defense procurement system, the Commission’s 
focus ultimately turned to the problems embedded in the acquisition process and the elimination 
of barriers which had up to this point discouraged the DoD’s acquisition of cutting-edge 
technologies. Foremost among its recommendations, the Commission called for the adoption of 
commercial processes and practices as a primary tool that the DoD could leverage to broaden its 
access to cutting-edge commercial products, services, and solutions. 
To further bolster this position, the Packard Commission report cited a 1985 Defense Science 
Board (DSB) study that “compared typical DoD development programs with successful 
                                                
3 First articulated in 1965, Moore’s Law states that the number of transistors on an integrated circuit doubles every two years.   
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programs from private industry.”  It used, as case studies, the development of the IBM 360 
computer, the Boeing 767 transport, the AT&T telephone switch, and the Hughes 
communication satellite.  Each of these programs were comparable in complexity and size to the 
development of a major weapon system; yet each took only half the time to develop, and cost 
concomitantly less (Packard, 1986). Earlier studies had also emphasized the importance of the 
DoD refocusing its efforts to increase its reliance on commercial products while decreasing its 
traditional dependence on government-unique specifications.  
Unlike other Packard Commission recommendations, commercial item acquisition reforms did 
not begin in earnest until the early 1990s.  In the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), Congress chartered the so-called “Section 800 Panel” to review and assess the efficacy 
of existing laws impacting the government’s acquisition system.4 The Section 800 report, 
published in January 1993 recommended a different approach to commercial items acquisitions, 
addressing both end items and components, and proposed the following: 
• Adding language explicitly stating a preference for acquiring commercial and non-
developmental items; 
• Adding an expanded exemption in TINA for “adequate price competition;”  
• Relieving the inappropriate requirement for cost or pricing data, in certain circumstances; 
• Relieving “Buy American” and other socio-economic restrictions; and 
Limiting the applicability of technical data requirements for commercial items. (DoD 
Acquisition Law Advisory Board, 1993) 
One of the most significant recommendations from the panel was the proposed addition of a new 
subpart in Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), specifically aimed at commercial items 
acquisitions.  The proposal provided for exemptions from statutes that the panel had determined 
were barriers to commercial acquisitions, such as audit rights and pricing (DoD Acquisition Law 
Advisory Board, 1993). In its July 1993 report on Defense Acquisition Reform, the Defense 
Science Board supported the 800 Panel’s recommendations and further urged their adoption. 
1994 turned out to be a bellwether year for both regulatory and legislative initiatives aimed at 
encouraging the acquisition of commercial products by eradicating decades-old barriers that had 
                                                
4 The Section 800 Panel was chartered by Section 800 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 
800, 104 Stat. 1485, 1587 (1990).  Interestingly enough, Congress had nothing to say about commercial items in the legislative history or 
founding of the Section 800 panel. 
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governed their use.  Secretary of Defense William Perry’s vision for streamlining and re-
engineering the acquisition system was captured in a report entitled Acquisition Reform: A 
Mandate for Change (Perry, 1994a). The goals set by Secretary Perry (who had been a member 
of the Packard Commission) included the following: 
• Integrate, broaden, and maintain a national industrial base sustained primarily by 
commercial demand but capable of meeting the DoD’s needs; 
• Acquire commercial and other state-of-the-art products and technology rapidly, from 
reliable suppliers that utilize the latest manufacturing and management techniques; 
• Assist in the conversion of U.S. defense-unique companies to dual-use production; 
• Aid in the transfer of military technology to the commercial sector; 
• Preserve defense-unique core capabilities (e.g., submarines, armored vehicles, and fighter 
aircraft); 
• Adopt the business processes of world-class customers and suppliers (including processes 
encouraging the DoD’s suppliers to follow suit); and 
• End the imposition of government-unique terms and conditions on contractors to the 
maximum extent practicable (Perry, 1994a). 
Secretary Perry moved forward with internal DoD reform efforts when he issued a follow-on 
memorandum repudiating the use of inflexible military specifications that limited competition, 
stifled innovation, increased costs, and delayed the fielding of new systems (Perry, 1994b). The 
“Perry Memo” (See Appendix 2) overturned the DoD’s traditional position on the use of military 
specifications by directing the services “to use performance and commercial specifications and 
standards in lieu of military specifications and standards, unless no practical alternative exists to 
meet the user’s needs” (Perry, 1994b p.1). Focusing on semi-conductors, Secretary Perry 
concluded that military specifications for semi-conductors alone added one to two billion dollars 
annually to the cost of technology (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007).  The future importance of 
commercial items to U.S. military strategy was outlined when then Under Secretary of Defense 
Kaminski (1995), testifying before a Senate Subcommittee, stated, “The military advantage goes 
to the nation who has the best cycle time to capture technologies that are commercially available; 
incorporate them in weapon systems; and get them fielded first.” 
Also in 1994, President Bill Clinton tasked Vice President Al Gore to lead the National 
Performance Review (NPR), an effort to improve federal management and execution.  The NPR 
was built on past reform efforts, most notably the Grace Commission (chaired by J. Peter Grace; 
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The White House, 1984). As part of the NPR effort in 1993, President Clinton noted that of the 
top 10 semi-conductor producers, five refused to conduct business with the government because 
of the special procurement requirements involved to do business with the government 
(“Announcement by President Clinton,” 1993). 
The momentum behind commercial items acquisitions had been steadily building within the 
administration, but comparable efforts were wanting when it came to Congress. That chasm was 
breached with the passage of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA)—
ground-breaking legislation that coalesced a number of existing legislative proposals growing 
out of the Section 800 Panel’s recommendations. 
Two years later, Senator Bill Cohen and Representative Bill Clinger introduced and Congress 
passed the landmark Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) as part of the FY 1996 National 
Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 104-106, div. D).  FARA expanded FASA’s scope 
regarding the preference for commercial items.  The aim of Division E of Pub. L. 104-106 
(Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996) was to leverage commercial 
advances in information technology through the adoption of commercial best acquisition and 
management practices. FARA and the Information Technology Management Reform Act are 
collectively known as the Clinger-Cohen Act. 
The passage of FASA and FARA radically modified the acquisition process by opening 
acquisitions to the commercial market and, thus, opening the door to the use of commercial 
industry components.  In a 2006 audit report, the DoD inspector general’s (DoD IG’s) office 
identified the importance and benefits of commercial item acquisition to DoD, including 
• access to state-of-the-art technology and products,	  
• savings on limited financial resources for research and development,	  
• establishment of a market price as a price analysis tool,	  
• integration of the defense and commercial industrial bases to benefit the nation’s security 
and economy,	  
• reduced economic risk associated with developing new items,	  
• more rapid deployment of state-of-the-art technologies and terms,	  
• access to proven technological capabilities,	  
• increased competition (DoD IG, 2006).	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FASA’s potential for significant cost savings and acquisition streamlining bore fruit under a 
legislatively authorized pilot program.  The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a Defense 
Acquisition Pilot Project, provided flexibility and latitude because the government was following 
the FASA mandate of conducting acquisition programs more like a commercial business.  The 
DoD studied industry best practices and returned with a clear understanding of the differences 
between the traditional DoD process and the processes employed in commercial industry.  
Commercial benchmarks became JDAM’s project goals, which led to a successful outcome.  
 
For the JDAM, the Pentagon estimated that adding fins and navigation sensors would cost 
approximately $40,000 per bomb, using the traditional approach of specifying the design and 
requiring military parts and production lines. However, rather than mandating that contractors 
follow the customary process, the DoD waived the detailed military specifications, granting 
companies the freedom to design the system, use off-the-shelf parts, and build the weapon as 
they would a commercial product. The final cost: $14,000 apiece versus the original $40,000 
estimate, amounting to a total savings of approximately $3 billion (Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense [Acquisition Reform], 1997). 
Prior to the enactment of FASA, commercial companies had to decide if it was economically 
feasible for them to establish two separate business lines to segregate the military from their 
commercial business.  Commercial products were simply not offered for sale to the government, 
due to the requirements for certified cost or pricing data, cost accounting standards, examination 
of records, and other government-unique requirements that added cost and business risk to the 
commercial business.  FASA established a preference for commercial items over military-unique 
items and provided for a streamlined procurement path under FAR Part 12, to include 
commercially derived items used by the military.   
As a result of FASA, many companies have technologies and product solutions that are offered 
to both commercial and military customers.  The synergies of common solutions for both 
markets provide great benefits to the customers.  Many of these companies (i.e., Honeywell, 
Harris, United Technologies, General Electric, and Rockwell Collins) are major players in both 
the civilian and military aerospace and information technology (IT) markets. 
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The ability to acquire commercial items has been an enormous asset to the warfighter.  The 
statutory preference for the acquisition of commercial items and components enabled many 
technologies developed for the commercial marketplace to be used for military applications.  The 
emphasis on market research enabled the government to look beyond the traditional “mil spec” 
suppliers and utilize proven commercial technology.  An example is the USAF Global Air 
Traffic Management Program, through which the military procured a major avionics upgrade for 
the KC-135 tanker cockpit using display and navigation technology developed for the air 
transport and regional jet market.  The decision to use commercial technologies rather than a 
military-unique solution resulted in a large cost savings to the USAF program.  This would have 
been impossible to achieve under a FAR Part 15 acquisition method.5  
The FASA statutory changes removed significant barriers to the acquisition of commercial items 
by the federal government, the underlying premise being that the government would use terms 
and conditions consistent with customary commercial practices.  The terms and conditions 
applicable to commercial items included in FAR Part 12 (52.212-4) include a wide range of sales 
terms used across the commercial industry.  Based on market research, these terms can be 
tailored for government acquisition of any particular commercial item.  In most situations, these 
terms have been very successful by helping to define the contractual relationship between the 
government and the contractor. However, there is room for considerable improvement in the 
market research and tailoring process to ensure consistency with customary commercial practice. 
Interest in pursuing additional commercial-type acquisition reforms led Congress to task the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) with identifying commercial best practices for 
comparable types of DoD acquisitions.  This was first done for systems’ development and 
production, then for logistics and other services. A comparable exercise had been used to identify 
best practices for the purchase and use of information technology that served as the basis for the 
information management provisions of the Clinger–Cohen Act.  Congress attempted to 
implement many of these best practices in subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts to 
provide management frameworks for both weapon systems and services acquisitions. 
                                                
5 Interview with authors. 
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Based on FASA reforms, commercial acquisitions became more prevalent and successfully 
implemented, according to numbers in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS):   
In 1996, DoD executed 475 contracts under the simplified commercial item procedures. By fiscal 
year 2011, commercial acquisition procedures were used for almost one-fifth of all the contracting 
dollars DoD obligated — nearly 13 million contracts worth almost $75 billion. Since 2005, DoD 
funds spent on those simplified acquisitions have more than doubled. (Serbu, 2012) 
As a result of almost 20 years of acquisition reforms following the Perry Memo, commercial 
technologies have been rapidly embedded into DoD weapons and command and control systems. 
Government-unique prime contractors who we spoke with said that they would not achieve the 
cost affordability goals the government is setting without being able to access this commercial 
market. At first glance, this is a surprising finding, as it should be in the government-unique 
contractors’ interest to get the government to pay them to replicate what is already out in the 
commercial marketplace.  While this incentive does exist, contractors argued that the systems 
they develop would be too costly without incorporating technologies from the non-traditional 
commercial contractors and would not obtain initial funding.   
Furthermore, these traditional companies were worried about trends at the DoD that are creating 
disincentives to the use of commercial contractors and the subsequent money-saving ideas and 
technologies.  As one representative of a major defense contractor stated, “If DoD wants to go 
military unique we will do that but it will be at a higher cost.”6 Another senior official from a 
large defense-unique firm stated, “The problem is, we are seeing from the same DoD actors, not 
only pressures to ‘spec’ out commercial contractors but pressures to reduce overall price.  The 
two policies are incompatible and could end up squeezing the margins of the traditional defense 
contractors and directly impact on the health of these companies.”7 
More will be said about the changing DoD environment for commercial items acquisition in 
Section V. The following chart shows the rapid increase in commercial contracting in the DoD 
since 1996, but also what could be an inflection point around 2009 as commercial item 
contracting began to decline at the DoD (Serbu, 2012). 
                                                
6 Interview with authors. 
7 Interview with authors. 
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Figure 1: DoD Commercial Contracting, 1996–2011 (Serbu, 2012) 
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III. Commercial Industries’ Value to DoD
The DoD’s ability to exclusively rely on a defense-unique industrial base is rapidly coming to an 
end.8  While the potential ramifications of this unfolding reality have been debated since the 
Packard Commission, the business processes of the acquisition bureaucracy have not reflected 
nor adequately addressed this radical change in circumstances.  R&D trends are generally 
reliable indicators of where future new ideas and products will surface.  For the past several 
decades, these trends have been moving away from the DoD and the U.S. government, toward 
commercial and global markets.   
At one time, the federal government and the DoD dominated R&D spending. For example, in 
1964, the federal government provided 67% of R&D funding and served as the driver of 
innovation in the economy (National Science Foundation [NSF], 2012). Today, the private sector 
provides over 60% of U.S. R&D funding and accounts for over 70% of its performance gains 
(NSF, 2012). This trend was noticed in the 1980s, after the achievement of parity in R&D 
between the U.S. government and U.S. commercial industry, and was a significant catalyst for 
acquisition reforms in the 1990s. While support for commercial item acquisition may have 
waned in the DoD during an era of expanding budgets, the rationale for taking advantage of an 
even larger share of commercial R&D is now greater than it was when FASA and Clinger–
Cohen were passed in the 1990s.   
What is different about the last 20 years is that the relative significance of the U.S. global share 
of R&D is also declining.  Just as the U.S. government no longer dominates U.S. R&D, the U.S. 
no longer dominates global R&D. In 2013, global R&D stood at around $1.5 trillion dollars, with 
the U.S. share at about 28% (Battelle, 2012). Thus, U.S. government R&D equals about 11% of 
global R&D, and U.S. private sector R&D is about 17% of global R&D.  The globalization trend 
of the past several decades has seen a significant dispersion of R&D (see Figure 2) and changed 
the nature of private sector R&D, as firms opened R&D facilities in China, India, Europe, Brazil, 
and around the globe (DSB, 2012).  The Defense Science Board recently described this trend: 
8 That is, if it wants to maintain its technological superiority and afford to modernize its equipment. 
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U.S. industry has long recognized the trend toward globalization of science and technology. Major 
corporations have approached the challenge to access the best ideas by going well beyond 
attending international meetings and reading publications. They have located research entities in 
strategic locales populated by a mixture of U.S. citizens and local scientists, and have populated 
research entities in the U.S. with the same mix.  
For many companies, location matters less to their increasingly virtual-and global-workforce. This 
is equally true for small startups without the time or money to pursue work permits, but that do 
have access to shared virtual workspaces and overnight shipping. Virtual tools improve 
communication among researchers both across the campus and around the world. Many 
companies have found they can maintain around-the-clock progress on critical discoveries by 
handing off results across time zones as one shift leaves the lab and another arrives for work. 
(DSB, 2012). 
Figure 2: R&D Expenditures by Country, 2013 Forecast (Battelle, 2012) 
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Figure 3: R&D Expenditures by Country, % of GDP, 2013 Forecast (Battelle, 2012) 
 
  
While the global expansion of R&D has raised security challenges that will be discussed later in 
this report, the key question for the DoD is this: To what degree should the government replicate 
relevant global R&D?  Absent open acquisition policies, the DoD risks allowing its potential 
adversaries to take advantage of a growing 89% of global R&D, while the U.S. government 
attempts to solely leverage an 11% share. The U.S. share may shrink further as federal budgets 
decline, due to budget austerity and R&D spending increases in the rest of the world.  This is a 
game the United States will not win if it does not embrace the global R&D market.  While the 
United States does maintain a cumulative technological lead from decades of aggregate 
expenditures of past R&D, it is by no means clear that other countries and commercial 
companies will not soon catch up and surpass current areas of U.S. technological dominance.  
For security reasons, the United States could first try to leverage the R&D of its closest allies.  
For example, the combined global R&D share (commercial and government) of the United 
States, UK, Japan, Germany, France, and South Korea totals 55% of global R&D.  But to access 
and create a true “allied” national security market and research network would require openness 
to commercial and global technology sharing heretofore unreachable due to U.S. security barriers 
and export controls. The limited Canadian exemption to the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) and the special defense trade treaties with the UK and Australia were steps 
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in that direction, but unfortunately have not significantly reduced the barriers to defense 
cooperation in these three countries, let alone served as a mechanism to incorporate commercial 
technologies or create a seamless open defense market.  
The U.S. government remains a vitally important player in global R&D, but it is important to 
ascertain where its R&D dollars are being spent.  To take maximum advantage of internal R&D 
activities performed at government labs and R&D funded by the government but performed by 
the private sector, the government must ensure that these activities are not duplicating ongoing 
efforts in the commercial sector.  A number of companies expressed great concerns that the DoD 
is susceptible to the “not-invented-here” syndrome, preferring items developed solely through 
DoD research, which is a prevalent attitude in the acquisition bureaucracy. On a number of 
occasions, commercial firms complained that U.S. government labs and government personnel 
find themselves in a conflicted situation by actively competing with, and replicating, commercial 
R&D in order to justify their budgets. If true, this replication has two costs—the costs of 
duplication and the cost of opportunities lost in the pursuit of R&D that could have been applied 
to other solutions.  We found numerous commercial firms who believed that government 
personnel had no interest in looking for competing solutions to ongoing research “programs of 
record,” even when those commercial solutions were readily available. Needless to say, in times 
of budget austerity, it becomes increasingly hard to justify any portion of defense R&D being 
spent on efforts that already exist in the commercial marketplace. 
An obvious, but nonetheless important, point to emphasize is that the 60% of U.S. R&D 
spending being underwritten by the private sector is market oriented.  Industry participants 
stressed that because of the underlying profit motive, these R&D efforts must have a path to 
commerciality.  In the end, there must be a market for whatever product results from this R&D.  
Decades of competition and incremental advances produce products that people and firms want 
to buy in large enough numbers to justify production levels that, in turn, maximize a firm’s 
profits.  Some companies commit to longer term research, but, generally speaking, most 
commercial firms target a potential near-term market application. 
It is hard to predict where the commercial marketplace will go in the future, except to say that 
ideas will continually be tested and demand for new products and services will rise and fall with 
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the demands of the consumer and the business judgments of firms that use these products to 
capture more business.  The market is efficient in this regard, and while good ideas usually find 
their way to the top, some market “failures” could meet the needs of the DoD, and some market 
successes may fall short of meeting the DoD’s needs.  The DoD must have a robust market 
research capability that can identify good ideas in the commercial market, which could meet the 
DoD’s needs while saving valuable R&D dollars and/or time to develop.  
Still, the DoD’s presence and relative buying power in many of these commercial markets is 
small.  Total contracts let by the DoD in 2012 equaled $362 billion9—an amount that is 
equivalent to the GDP of Thailand.  Expected declines in 2013 due to budget cuts and 
sequestration may take total contracts down closer to the GDP of Denmark which is $332 billion. 
And, while Denmark enjoys a dynamic economy, it dominates few markets.  The same can be 
said about the DoD.  There are a few military-unique markets that the DoD dominates with its 
purchasing power, but in other markets, the DoD is simply one of many customers.  
Nowhere is this more evident than in the $3.7 trillion market for information technology (IT) 
(Gartner, 2013).  This massive market can support high levels of R&D as the demand in the 
commercial marketplace for new solutions drives innovation.  The DoD’s market share for the 
less than $40 billion of IT bought annually10 is about 1% of the global market, and even this 
purchasing power is diluted over a number of different IT market segments.  In very few of these 
segments does the DoD exert much influence.  The DoD is just another customer in this market 
and, from the perspective of many of these IT firms, “given its oftentimes unreasonable demands 
and legal requirements,” it is not an attractive customer to pursue by commercial firms, whose 
business models do not lend themselves to customization.11 
The DoD’s primary leverage point is investing in dual-use technologies that the commercial 
market is not funding—because they are too risky, are too long term, or require a higher level of 
quality than other customers are willing to pay for.  If the DoD were to take greater advantage of 
these investment opportunities and allow a path to commerciality, its ability to attract the “best 
and the brightest” engineers and firms would be significantly enhanced. If it does not decide up-
9 See USAspending.gov for annual DoD contract spending numbers. 
10 For current DoD IT spending, see Federal IT Dashboard 2014 at www.itdashboard.gov, and for the 2013 budget, see Corrin (2012). 
11 Interview with authors. 
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front how intellectual property and export controls will be handled in a way that allows for a 
large commercial market to develop, it is doubtful that many commercial firms will agree to 
team with the DoD in developing solutions that address its more stringent requirements. 
The IT markets that could potentially meet this test include 1) information security solutions; 2) 
counterfeit parts and secure supply chain solutions; and 3) developing data analysis tools to 
identify useful data out of large data bases and multiple data management systems.  The 
following chart outlines some of the commercial industries that the DoD could potentially 
leverage in the coming decades by buying directly from these industries or directing R&D in 
areas that the commercial market will not fund due to the lack of sufficient, near-term 
commercial opportunities.  
Figure 4: Commercial Technologies of Importance to DoD 
Obviously, there are many other sectors that could be important and any such list will change 
over time, but each of these sectors has huge potential to be leveraged by the DoD.  In the last 20 
years, the IT industry (i.e., telecommunications, computer hardware, software, services) has been 
the primary focus of acquisition reformers.  Advances in this sector will continue to outpace the 
ability of the DoD to replicate it.  Efforts such as the DoD’s “trusted foundries” or diminishing 
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manufacturing sources and material shortages” initiatives illustrate just how expensive and 
difficult it will be for the DoD to catch up with the market on its own.  
Advances in networking and robotics -- creating new autonomous land, underwater, and flying 
vehicles -- will continue to find commercial markets.  Industry officials we met questioned how 
the United States interprets its obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MCTR) treaty, and many firms were concerned that this current restrictive U.S. position might 
encourage unmanned R&D activities to become concentrated overseas, as companies seek 
commercial opportunities.  There was a concern expressed that unmanned systems could be 
susceptible to the experience suffered by the commercial space industry after its technologies 
were legislatively transferred to the ITAR control regime. Similarly, the night vision industry 
suffered when U.S. export controls limited the ability of U.S. industry to develop and compete 
for commercial opportunities. In each case, foreign competitors eventually took over commercial 
market shares to the detriment of U.S. companies.  
There is a great incentive for commercial companies to reduce energy costs and apply 
commercial advances directly to DoD buildings, operations, and bases.  The potential use of 
Energy Savings Performance Contracts (up to 25-year contracts authorized by Congress for this 
purpose) would allow the DoD to take advantage of new technologies as long as the DoD can 
commit to remaining in that location long enough to allow firms to capitalize their initial 
investments.  However, the DoD’s policies limiting the length of contracts make many of these 
solutions economically unfeasible in the DoD market, as firms cannot justify the up-front capital 
investment.  
The DoD can also leverage other industries.  For the military-unique aircraft, ground vehicle, 
space, and shipbuilding programs, there are corresponding commercial airplane and helicopter, 
automotive and truck, space, and shipbuilding industries. The ability to rapidly produce and field 
MRAPs during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts was a direct result of tapping into the 
capabilities of the commercial tire, automotive, and truck industries.  Components and 
manufacturing techniques from many commercial segments could prove useful to the DoD.  For 
example, General Dynamics’ NASSCO shipyard, which builds U.S. Navy support ships, has 
revamped its shipbuilding operations by partnering with a South Korean firm and learning 
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commercial best shipbuilding practices, resulting in reduced costs and enhanced performance. 
Many commercial firms are investing significant R&D efforts in materials research.  The 
possibility of developing lighter, stronger, and less expensive materials for use in weapons 
platforms is a likely future trend.  Advances in manufacturing technologies could potentially 
revolutionize the way platforms are built.  The potential disruption from 3-D printing and its 
effect on spurring on other advances in more traditional machine tools and manufacturing 
technologies are yet to be felt, but will likely be significant and have military applications. 
Some of the truly innovative cost-saving measures that the DoD can leverage are found in the 
services industries and in commercial industry business process improvements.  Commercial 
business practices in logistics, transportation, inventory tracking, and other aspects of supply 
chain management can be emulated in the DoD, if it is open to such money- and time-saving 
ideas.  Unfortunately, this is not an easy market for commercial firms to sell into. For example, 
one company developed a logistics tracking technology under a DARPA contract and has been 
highly successful in the commercial marketplace.  However, with only a small number of 
intermittent sales to support contingency operations, the company had limited success breaking 
into the DoD market.  This firm was subsequently acquired, and a decision was made to shut 
down the government side of the business and focus exclusively on commercial markets.12  
                                                
12 Interview with authors. 
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IV. Typology: What is a Non-Traditional Commercial Contractor? 
The degree of imprecision in the definitions of a commercial or a non-traditional contractor 
leads to a significant amount of confusion, and possibly misguided policy choices. Sometimes, 
these phrases are used interchangeably and sometimes not.  Depending on one’s definition, there 
may be non-traditional defense and non-traditional commercial contractors as well as traditional 
defense and traditional commercial contractors. There are several ways to try to categorize the 
defense industrial base: by types of goods and services sales, by contracting mechanisms used, 
and by technologies that the DoD wants to buy.  This section will attempt to explore some of 
these definitional issues.   
As a starting point, it may be easiest to define traditional military contractors. While this could 
be an “I know it when I see it” exercise, even this is not so easy to do once one looks at the data.  
For example, the following chart (Figure 5) shows the top U.S. defense contractors by aggregate 
defense sales, including both U.S. and foreign defense sales. 
From this data, most observers would consider Lockheed, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman to 
be traditional defense contractors, based on their percentages of defense sales to overall sales. 
Thus, a beginning definition for a traditional defense contractor could be those firms with a high 
percentage of defense or government sales to total sales.  
But what about Boeing, which is second in total defense sales but only 38.4% of its total sales 
are defense sales.  Is it a traditional defense contractor?  Well, yes and no.  By most definitions, 
its defense unit—Boeing Defense, Space, and Security—would be a traditional defense 
contractor, but Boeing Commercial Airplanes ($49.1 billion in revenue in 2012), accounting for 
over 60% of Boeing’s sales, would not be.  Thus, within Boeing there is a traditional defense 
contracting entity and a primarily commercial entity.  A similar situation exists at General 
Dynamics.  While 66.7% of its sales are in the defense sector, its Gulfstream unit is primarily 
commercial. Focusing on business units or entities within companies may perhaps be the more 
appropriate way to analyze the industrial base.  
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There are several other companies that have large aggregate defense sales, but these defense 
sales are not the majority of sales within the company, such as United Technologies (21%) and 
Honeywell (13.5%).  Companies that fall below the 10% threshold for the top U.S. defense 
contractors by DoD sales include Hewlett Packard at 2.2%, GE at 2.7%, Accenture at 3.1%, 
Bechtel at 6.6%, Fluor at 6.6%, and Navistar at 7.7%.  These companies would be non-
traditional companies, if one chose a definition of having a low percentage of defense sales to 
overall sales, but others might disagree, based on their having high overall aggregate defense 
sales.   
Some of these firms have defense-specific units within their corporations, and creating stand-
alone defense units seems to have become the standard way of organizing defense businesses for 
commercial firms.  Many firms have chosen to structure themselves in a way that walls off their 
commercial side of the house from the defense business, with separate production lines and 
separate products for each line of business.  So looking at subsidiaries (defense-unique and 
commercial) as a unit of measure, versus the firm, is one way of looking at this issue.  However, 
other companies (like Rockwell Collins) have commingled commercial and defense production, 
or have attempted to standardize products across both the defense and commercial sectors, as 
much as possible.  Comingling, or “civil–military integration,” was one of the goals of 
commercial procurement reforms of the 1990s, and has been successful in a number of programs, 
but has been in decline as an organizational model since the DoD has modified its oversight of 
commercial items.   
The benefits of civil–military integration are great.  There was substantial cost to the DoD when, 
for example, Boeing Commercial Airplanes sold fully operational “green” commercial aircraft to 
its defense sector. Once flown to a Boeing defense sector facility, the airplane would be torn 
apart to modify it for military purposes, rather than making those modifications on the 
commercial line as is now taking place with the P-8 and the KC-45A tanker.  This old, pre-
FASA way of modifying commercial aircraft was done because of all of the unique military 
requirements the government imposed on commercial products.  
In fact, Boeing used to coproduce commercial and military aircraft at its Wichita, KS, plant, but 
(for cost accounting reasons—specifically the requirement to allocate their research investment 
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[IR&D] based on the facility sales) they moved their production to California—and lost the 
economies of scale benefits to the cost of DoD aircraft.  With the production commingling 
inherent in civil–military integration, a commercial entity (a part of a firm) or a commercial 
contractor (the entire firm) could have a large segment of government business but still be 
predominantly commercial in its outlook, operations, and business practices. This civil–military 
integration of production has been replicated for engines, avionics, aircraft, helicopters, 
information technologies, and other components in a number of firms.  
A return to the old way of doing business by modifying the DoD’s commercial aircraft in 
separate facilities would make these programs uneconomical in today’s budget environment.  
However, several interviewees stated that the DoD’s current acquisition oversight policies, in 
some sectors, are forcing commercial industry to consider re-establishing separate military and 
commercial facilities and production lines.  Thus, because the DoD’s production needs in many 
sectors are so much smaller than commercial ones, the equivalent process of “tearing up a brand 
new aircraft to militarize it” are being considered again in some sectors.  Since the P-8 and the 
KC-45 are the largest defense programs that are using civil–military integration as an acquisition 
strategy, these programs could serve as a bellwether to watch trends in commercial contracting 
and the future of civil–military integration; but precisely because they are so big, these programs 
may get treated in a more favorable way than smaller defense programs. 
Non-traditional commercial companies would be expected to have a small ratio of government 
sales to overall sales. Figure 6 includes a number of commercial contractors that could possibly 
be important to the DoD in the future, along with their current government sales percentages.  
The table also notes the profit margin for these firms, and many exceed the average of defense 
firms of 8% for goods and 5% for services, and a number of the firms exceed the regulatory 
contract maximum of 15%. 
Most of these firms’ defense sales are either non-existent or below 5%.  The 2–5% threshold 
may be a good cut-off point to begin classifying firms, but there are a few firms such as GE and 
Hewlett Packard that would stand out in this criterion for their large aggregate sales.  (In fact, 
they made the “Top Defense Contractors” list—see Figure 5.)  For these firms, a further degree 
of analysis would have to look at how they are organized to do business with the DoD.  GE has a 
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military engines component within its overall engine subsidiary, and that component could likely 
be defined as a traditional defense entity while the rest of GE’s engine components, and the rest 




























Figure 6: Commercial Contractors by Government Sales, 201213 
 
                                                
13 UMD Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise research staff compiled data from annual reports, prime contract and subcontract data 





Another way to identify the difference between a traditional and commercial contractor and 
entity is to look at the types of contracts employed. A traditional defense contracting entity 
would likely be covered by and comply with the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) and a bevy 
of defense-unique business requirements.  The non-traditional commercial entity portion of a 
firm would likely adhere to commercial accounting standards and practices.  
The determination of whether a firm has CAS-covered contracts is the only definition of a non-
traditional contractor in statute.  It is found in Section 2302 (9) of Title 10, U.S.C., and addresses 
the application of the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) for prototype projects:   
The term “nontraditional defense contractor”, with respect to a procurement or with respect to a transaction 
authorized under section 2371 (a) of this title, means an entity that is not currently performing and has not 
performed, for at least the one-year period preceding the solicitation of sources by the Department of 
Defense for the procurement or transaction, any of the following for the Department of Defense: 
(A) Any contract or subcontract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards 
prescribed pursuant to section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 422) 
and the regulations implementing such section.  
(B) Any other contract in excess of $500,000 under which the contractor is required to submit 
certified cost or pricing data under section 2306a of this title. 
This is a useful starting point as a definition for two reasons.  The first reason is that this 
definition breaks a firm down into its business units by defining a contractor as an “entity.”  This 
typology should be more widely used than it is now as a tool for analyzing the industrial base 
because it distinguishes between units within a firm.  The second reason that the Title 10 
definition provides a foundation for defining a non-traditional contractor is by using CAS to 
distinguish between a traditional and non-traditional entity.  If a business unit invests in CAS 
accounting systems, then it is probably committed to being a traditional defense contractor and 
has in place all of the compliance mechanisms to address government-unique oversight 
requirements.  
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However, subsection (B) of this definition quickly runs into problems and is probably too narrow 
for this research and for policy-makers.  A large business unit in a commercial firm with no 
defense sales would cross this threshold with the award of a $500,000 competitive research 
contract.  This was indeed the case with one interviewed Fortune 100 company that continually 
becomes ineligible for OTAs on an annual basis.  For this reason, Congress should eliminate 
subsection (B) as a definition for a non-traditional contractor or, at a minimum, ensure that 
competitive R&D contracts are exempted from this definition (see more details on this below).   
Trying to classify a firm in its entirety can be problematic given how companies have organized 
themselves to do business.  Many firms (but not all) are aggregations of different profit centers 
that don’t always have the same culture or business practices.  This is especially true for those 
firms that have created stand-alone government subsidiaries to do government work.  Thus, for 
purposes of a typology, it is better to break down each firm into its stand-alone subsidiaries. If a 
subsidiary has a high level of defense sales (admittedly an arbitrary threshold), a unique 
government accounting system, and CAS-covered contracts, that “entity” is a traditional defense 
contracting entity.  If it doesn’t meet those criteria, it is a commercial entity.  If the commercial 
entity has a high level of defense or government sales, it can still be classified as a traditional 
commercial entity.  If it has limited (e.g., 2–5%) or currently non-existent sales to the DoD, it 
can easily be classified as a non-traditional commercial entity.   
Just to round out the classification system matrix, an entity such as a foreign defense subsidiary 
of a U.S. firm or a foreign-owned defense contractor with a large degree of non-U.S. defense 
sales could be labeled as a non-traditional defense entity.  However, if the U.S. entity sold 
primarily to the DoD, it would be considered a traditional defense entity.  For example, the UK 
operations of BAE would be a non-traditional defense entity under this definition, while its 
operations in the United States under its Special Security Agreement would be a traditional 
defense entity. Many global defense contractors that do little business with the DoD would likely 
fit into this classification (of non-traditional) and could be the sources of new technologies and a 
mechanism to capture overseas commercial technologies and R&D. 
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Figure 7: Typology of DoD Suppliers 
Traditional Defense Contractor Entity High % of defense sales; CAS 
Traditional Commercial Entity Low % of defense sales; no or limited CAS 
Non-Traditional Defense Entity Foreign located defense entity (high % of 
defense sales, limited U.S. defense sales) 




Another classification route is to use the different definitions in the FAR as to what constitutes a 
commercial item or service.  Depending on the data, firms could be classified in accordance with 
the type of commercial item they sell or could sell to the DoD.  Firms could also be classified 
based on sector, by percentage of sales to the DoD or the federal government, as a technology 
leader or follower, or by structure (whether they are purely commercial; predominantly a 
commercial firm that has established a unique government division; an integrated, diversified 
commercial/military contractor; or a commercial division residing within a traditional military 
contractor). In one firm, many types of entities could theoretically exist. 
Once commercial entities have been identified, two further ways of classifying these entities 
could prove helpful to the DoD.  The first is how the entity sells to the government, and the 
second is what the entity is capable of developing.  The Defense Science Board, in its 2009 
report on buying commercial, identified eight levels of commercial items (see Figure 8) that the 










Figure 8: DSB Levels of Commercial Contracting (DSB, 2009) 
 
Using these eight levels is a useful starting point in classifying commercial companies or 
commercial entities within companies. In addition, for each classification level, it should be 
noted whether an entity is prepared to sell directly to the DoD, or indirectly—only through an 
intermediary (a reseller or a traditional defense contractor). For example, a corporate decision 
may have been made to only sell COTS products to the government through a reseller.   
However, the DoD may want to work directly with this entity to modify its product at Level 4, or 
the company may be capable of working with the DoD at a higher level but will not modify its 
business practices to be able to offer that level of effort to the DoD.  In addition, each 
commercial entity would have two classification levels—one that shows its current status, and 
the other that is either a capability or aspirational status.  Figure 9 illustrates those two levels for 
one commercial entity, such as Apple, which today is likely a Level 1 indirect provider; 
however, the DoD may aspire someday to have Apple working at Level 4 direct.  Ultimately, the 
entire commercial industrial base of interest to the DoD could be continually assessed based on 
this classification system. This classification system could be useful in determining whether it is 
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worthwhile to reduce barriers to participation for those entities that have a large delta between 
current status and aspirational status. 
Figure 9: Commercial Entity Classification Example 
DSB Level Direct Indirect Current Status Aspirational 
Capability 
1  X X  
2     
3     
4 0   0 
5     
6     
7     




V. Challenges and Barriers to Commercial Acquisition  
The respondents consistently emphasized the same general themes in their responses to the study 
questions. Many of the barriers to commercial contracting identified in the 1993 Section 800 
Panel report (DoD Acquisition Law Advisory Board, 1993) still exist and continue to be relevant 
to the discussion.  Since some of those issues were not subsequently addressed by either statutory 
or regulatory reform, and others were not effectively implemented, many respondents called for 
the Section 800 issues to be revisited by a new panel of experts.  
Observers also said that they believed many of the positive reforms that were enacted in the 
1990s have eroded in the last five years.  In fact, there was a widespread belief that the paradigm 
for commercial contracting was being threatened from within the DoD.  Until that trend is 
addressed, further commercial reforms will not succeed—they will be systematically thwarted by 
the DoD acquisition and oversight organizations.  While the auditing and contracting 
communities received most of the criticism for this environmental change, there were also 
concerns raised about the DoD’s technical requirements and security communities. However, 
principal grievances were leveled against the senior leadership of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and the military services, who are seen as lacking a clear understanding of the 
relationship between the defense acquisition system and the global industrial base, and who have 
not provided support for the acquisition of commercial items.  In the absence of leadership 
advocacy and guidance, the nullification of the acquisition reforms of the 1990s is being allowed 
to take place. 
The barriers commercial contractors face when selling to the government can be grouped into the 
following three categories:  
•  openness of the market to commercial solutions,  
•  market risks, and  
•  unique government requirements.  
The underlying environmental barrier or market openness will be addressed first, as it impacts 
other barriers to commercial contracting.  The specific barriers inherent in market risks and 
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unique government requirements will be addressed in turn.  Significant barriers to doing business 
with the DoD persist, and the cost of complying with the many attendant unique requirements 
continues to be borne solely by those being regulated.  The following statement still rings true: 
“So confusing and time-consuming is the current legal and regulatory environment for defense 
acquisition that it suffocates its own reason for being: aiding the war fighter” (Business 
Executives for National Security [BENS], 2009). 
Figure 10: Government Requirements That Create Barriers to Commercial Contracting 
DoD Environment for Commercial Items 
The openness of the defense market to commercial goods and services has declined significantly 
in the last five years.  During this time, the DoD has seen a return of a culture of risk aversion 
and adversarial business relations with industry.  This culture has been allowed to re-assert itself 
due to leadership signals from both Congress and the executive branch.  Perhaps these signals 
have been misinterpreted by the DoD’s acquisition workforce, and some of the lessons learned 
from past procurement scandals have been misapplied across the board.  Whatever the reason, 
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the pendulum has radically swung back from the acquisition reforms of the 1990s.  It is unclear 
whether leadership truly envisioned the degree of this shift and that these policies were the 
expected outcomes derived from issues related to wartime contracting and the proposed Air 
Force tanker lease.  Regardless, without a new, significant leadership intervention, a return to the 
pre–FASA-reform industrial base and many of the acquisition problems the DoD faced in the 
1980s may be inevitable. 
The Section 800 Panel observed the changes taking place in the industrial base in the early 1990s 
—changes that are remarkably similar to those occurring today. The biggest exceptions are that 
the unique defense industrial base is considerably smaller and less competitive today than it was 
in the 1990s, and the globalization of the supply chain had yet to take place on a grand scale two 
decades ago. 
Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that an industrial base built around the global requirements 
of the Cold War had the capacity to respond to the demands of a regional conflict.  However, as a 
study by the Air Force Association noted, this industrial base “no longer exists.” This exodus from 
the defense marketplace was not solely due to the downturn in defense spending:  “Firms, 
particularly subcontractors and suppliers of system components, are moving from defense to the 
commercial market, where the profits are better and where business is conducted in a more stable, 
less adversarial manner.” (DoD Acquisition Law Advisory Board, 1993) 
There was a similar refrain from today’s industrial base.  The boards of directors of many 
commercial firms are currently debating whether the defense market is worth the risks for 
such limited gains.  From industry’s perspective, the breakdown in industry–government 
communications, adversarial relations, and distrust that the government will do the right 
thing, may well be the worst seen since the advent of acquisition reforms in the early 
1990s.  This issue is extremely troubling and is one that will impact more than just 
commercial item contracting.  
Adversarial relations with industry begin with government employees’ and political leaders’ 
views toward industry.  Do these employees believe industry is a potential partner to help solve 
problems the government cannot, or do they believe industry is trying to “rip the government 
off” any chance it can get?  It is the latter view that has prevailed since senior leadership set the 
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tone with President Obama’s speech on federal procurement in March 2009 (The White House, 
2009) that is referred to by some in the defense industry as the “culture of corruption” speech.14 
While it is not clear that the President was targeting more than a small subset of acquisition 
issues related to wartime contracting abuses, the application of his concern has been much wider 
than the limited number of overseas contracts that have been winding down as the United States 
extricates itself from Iraq and Afghanistan.  For better or for worse, this speech, and the policy 
memos issued as a result, have established an atmosphere of distrust for the procurement 
community resulting in adversarial relations with industry, a return to government-unique 
oversight mechanisms (that are not applicable to commercial contracting), a reinstatement of 
government-unique requirements, and a prevalent culture of risk aversion.   
Each of these traits was embedded in the procurement and oversight community prior to the 
enactment of FASA.  The change in culture necessary to disable these traits required that federal 
leaders provide the encouragement and political support for the acquisition community to 
exercise the necessary discretion and sound business judgment in order to get the best deal for 
the DoD.  In retrospect, we can see that this culture change was never fully achieved at the DoD.  
As soon as the opportunity arose, advocates for more prescriptive policies were able to reaffirm 
and reinstate these older policies.  In hindsight, it is obvious that the efforts of a few tradition-
bound players led to actions to block the option to tailor policies to fit the situation. One-size-
fits-all solutions and the elimination of discretionary authority on behalf of the acquisition 
community are making a comeback. As one former senior DoD official stated when asked about 
some of these one-size-fits-all policies, “This is because of the growing inexperienced 
workforce.”  The new workforce replacing older retirees as they leave the DoD “cannot be 
expected to exercise that level of discretion.”15 
In fact, currently, 55% of the DoD acquisition workforce has only five years of experience—and 
most of the senior, potential mentors have retired; for example, in 1990, the Army had five 
14 Actually what the president said was, “The days of giving defense contractors a blank check are over,” as well as, “But I reject the false choice 
between securing this nation and wasting billions of taxpayer dollars. And in this time of great challenges, I recognize the real choice between 
investments that are designed to keep the American people safe and those that are designed to make a defense contractor rich.”  His comments 
about waste, fraud, and abuse in defense contracting were interpreted by Danielle Brian, executive director of the Project on Government 
Oversight, who was quoted in the Washington Post the day after the speech as saying that “by giving this speech, President Obama has 
highlighted the culture of corruption (emphasis added) in contracting in Washington and is embracing the necessary changes to fix it.”  (Wilson, 
Scott and Robert O'Harrow Jr.) 
15 Interview with authors.  
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general officers with contracting experience, while in 2009, it had none. 
Commercial contracting requires the exercise of discretion and involves some calculated risk.  It 
simply cannot survive in a risk averse environment.  A major factor contributing to the DoD’s 
apparent departure from commercial products acquisition in favor of the old way of doing 
business is the return to an entrenched cultural aversion to risk.  This mindset appears to be based 
on the following: 
• lack of training and guidance on how to conduct a commercial procurement;
• fear of making mistakes and suffering the potential (or perceived) consequences (i.e.,
testifying before Congress; being a featured player in a case of waste, fraud, and
abuse; and/or derailing a government career and/or possibility for promotion); and
• ingrained distrust of industry leading to a habit of keeping “an arm’s length distance”
relationship with contractor counterparts.
In describing the overarching DoD environment in one program (one that is relevant to many 
others in the Department), the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) found, “The culture does not 
encourage delegation of authority to make binding decisions at the minimum level possible. This 
results in slow decision-making and decisions being revisited” (Ketrick, Paul K. et al., 2011). 
A series of additional events over the last decade has also contributed to the undermining of the 
commercial item consensus in DoD.  The first was budgetary.  The increase in defense spending 
since September 11th shifted the focus of the Department from an emphasis on saving money in a 
downturn by using commercial products and practices to one of addressing the exigencies of 
contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At least in the more traditional acquisition 
programs and day-to-day operations of the Department, budgetary pressures were eased, and 
finding commercial solutions became less and less important.  Ironically, the need to get 
solutions out to the field faster enhanced the participation by non-traditional contractors in rapid 
acquisition initiatives, such as counter-IED, surveillance, and MRAP vehicle programs.  
However, these rapid deployment programs may become casualties of the new acquisition 
environment, as the United States withdraws from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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The Darleen Druyun scandal, uncovered during a congressional investigation into the proposed 
sole-source Boeing tanker lease in 2003, undermined support in Congress for some commercial 
item procurements.  As the original appropriations language specifically defined the Boeing 
tanker as a commercial item, this commercial item exemption was interpreted by some as a way 
for more traditional contractors to avoid the acquisition oversight process.  A similar effort by 
the Army to use an OTA for development of the Future Combat System (FCS) and the Air Force 
commercial item contract for C-130Js convinced many that commercial item reforms had gone 
too far.  On the other hand, the use of a commercial 767 aircraft as the basis for the tanker, the 
ability to access commercial robotics companies for the FCS, and the encouraging of Lockheed 
to invest its own money into upgrades to the C-130J, similar to a commercial aircraft company, 
could make a case for using some of these authorities.  Rather than a blanket skepticism of those 
authorities, perhaps the key question that should have been asked is “To what extent did the use 
of commercial item authorities by the government make sense, and what level of authority would 
be appropriate to use in these cases?”   
Another concern about insufficient justifications for commercial item procurements was raised in 
a 2006 DoD IG report.  Subsequent DoD concern about  potential “high” profit margins for some 
commercial procurements bought under the “of a type” definition of commercial items, as 
compared to more traditional defense contracts, led the administration in 2012 to support a 
legislative proposal to eliminate the “of a type” definition from the statutory commercial item 
definition. While Congress rejected the DoD’s request, the Senate did express concern over the 
narrow issue of sole source spare parts buys: 
The Administration requested legislation that would amend the definition of commercial items in 
section 103 of title 41, United States Code, to exclude items that are merely “offered for sale” or 
“of a type” offered for sale in the commercial marketplace. The committee declines to make this 
change. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) (Public Law 103-355) adopted 
a broad definition of commercial items to ensure that federal agencies would have ready access to 
products that are available in the commercial marketplace—including new products and modified 
products that are just becoming available. Such access remains particularly critical in fast moving 
commercial markets, including the markets for information technology and other advanced 
products. 
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At the same time, the committee shares the Administration’s concern that some contractors have 
abused the commercial item definition to obscure cost and price information with regard to spare 
parts and components for DoD weapon systems. As DoD has pointed out, the Government 
Accountability Office and the DoD Inspector General have both criticized the Department for 
using commercial item procedures to procure items that are misclassified as commercial items and 
are not subject to competitive price pressure in the commercial marketplace. (S. Rep. No. 112-173, 
(2012) 
The Senate then included a provision in its 2013 NDAA bill to authorize the DoD to require 
contractors to provide additional data, including certified cost or pricing data, when necessary to 
evaluate the price reasonableness of certain commercial items that are procured for the support of 
a major system (S. Rep. No. 112-173, (2012). In reviewing the Senate proposal, however, the 
conference committee came to the conclusion that existing law in Title 10, U.S.C.,  
sections 2379 and 2306a (d) provide the Department with the authority that it needs to obtain price 
information and uncertified cost information, when necessary to evaluate the price reasonableness of 
commercial items.  The inconsistent use of this authority by the Department appears to have created 
uncertainty in the vendor community without assuring reasonable prices. *Conference Rep. No. 112-705, 
(2013).   
The conferees asked the Department to issue guidance “to address these problems” Conference 
Rep. No. 112-705, (2013).  
Still, the desire for this language by the DoD has sent a signal throughout the acquisition 
community that commercial item procurements are now riskier and no longer the default options, 
despite the language in FASA. This transcends potential overcharging on a few sole-source spare 
parts buys (that was of concern to the Senate) and is being applied DoD-wide. There appears to 
be a growing bias in the DoD to look toward military-unique suppliers so that the government 
can validate their costs and add a “reasonable” profit to that work, versus paying less for 
commercial items without detailed knowledge of the underlying costs or profit margins of 
commercial contractors.  Accepting higher commercial margins in exchange for a lower price 
was the basis for the “buy more with less” reforms of the 1990s.   
Today, instead of being rewarded for getting a better deal on price, a procurement official may 
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be questioned if a contractor’s profits appear to be too high.  It doesn’t take long for a DoD 
acquisition official to understand that the auditors will not question them if they are working on a 
CAS-covered contract with a military-unique contractor, versus a commercial one, even if 
comparable prices for the CAS-covered contract are higher.  Thus, the entire rationale for 
commercial contracting is under threat from within the DoD, ironically, by those who are 
supposed to be charged with ensuring that the DoD gets more for its money.  This might be an 
ease-of audit issue, as it is much easier to audit a government-unique CAS standard than it is to 
determine a reasonable price in the commercial market.  But the audit community must be 
directed to establish audit criteria that, even if more difficult, are less intrusive and don’t drive 
commercial firms and practices away from the DoD marketplace.  Current audit criteria and 
policies of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), the DoD IG, and the Defense 
Procurement Acquisition Policy (DPAP), and the application of this criteria in a one-size-fits-all 
basis are significantly responsible for overturning the commercial acquisition reforms of the 
1990s in practice.  These organizations should consider the long-term ramifications of their 
oversight efforts in terms of less innovation, greater costs, a narrowing of the industrial base, and 
lower competition.  
Given these trends, the current defense acquisition environment for commercial items is worse 
than it has been since the advent of acquisition reform in the 1990s.  There does not appear to be 
an advocate in senior leadership, as there was in the 1990s, when commercial acquisition reforms 
were driven from the top by Secretary of Defense William Perry, who brought to the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) a unique background in electronics, defense, and finance.  
Without this top-down support, each of the acquisition stovepipes will tend to maximize the 
interest of their areas of responsibility and potentially sub-optimize the acquisition process as a 
whole.  
Consequential Risks 
As commercial contractors weigh the pros and cons of doing business with the government, they 
must consider potential consequential risks that arise out of a direct federal contract.  These 
monetary and compliance risks would have a direct and significant impact on a company’s or 
 44 
brand’s reputation, if they were caught up in a civil and/or criminal liability or possible 
suspension and debarment proceedings.  Given the current environment, and the adversarial 
relations between government and industry, these risks are now higher. 
Each federal contractor must weigh the costs associated with the countless compliance 
requirements imposed upon government contractors—many of which will still apply to those 
firms even if they are only selling COTS items directly to the government.  Traditional 
government contractors will have already made the necessary investments in building a 
formalized compliance program staffed by an internal bureaucracy.  Commercial contractors 
seeking entry into the government market must establish a compliance baseline to meet these 
requirements—a monumental effort requiring a concomitant investment of corporate funds. 
Contractors must either develop best practices for mitigating collateral risks, and be prepared to 
demonstrate to the defense agencies (i.e., DCAA/DCMA) their compliance with government 
contract requirements, or expose the company to monetary and/or reputational penalties. 
A company must exercise due diligence in assessing the unlikely but nevertheless possible 
impact of becoming entangled in a case of non-compliance with some obscure federal 
acquisition requirement.  A relatively minor oversight or misstep may quickly escalate into 
blaring press headlines, civil or criminal penalties, a loss of corporate credibility, and a major 
blow to the company’s brand.  Is the prospect of winning a government contract worth the hefty 
upfront investment in compliance risk mitigation?  Can one afford to forfeit the company’s 
otherwise stellar reputation as a commercial company, as a consequence of an employee’s 
unintended mistake on a government contract?  Many COTS firms have decided that for the 
majority of their products, this risk is too great.  They have turned to resellers to gain them some 
semblance of protection from these potential liabilities.  This is a logical step toward completely 
eliminating their interactions with the U.S. government and the DoD.   
One senior Washington Office industry representative said that justifying staying in the federal 
market is a daily sell to his corporate leadership and that “they keep asking why I am spending 
80% of my time on problems [with federal contracting] that only represent less than 1% of our 
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business.”16  In these instances, many problems arise from firms’ efforts to provide the U.S. 
government with more alternatives than just COTS (i.e., modifying their commercial product to 
meet a unique government requirement).  However, some firms have made the decision that 
modifying their products for government applications is simply not worth the attendant 
headaches. In addition to the compliance burden, the added costs of modifying a commercial 
product to meet the government’s requirements will impinge upon a contractor’s ability to meet 
its business goals and stockholder expectations. 
Financial Barriers 
A clear understanding of the commercial marketplace and the financial institutions that underpin 
those markets is necessary to gain insights into the challenges that face commercial contractors 
dealing with the DoD.  Firms and individuals risk their capital, engineering talent, and expertise 
on a certain outcome, and expect a competitive rate of return for taking that risk.  Managers who 
do not make a profit are replaced and firms that don’t make a profit eventually shut down.  The 
expectation of achieving comparable profit margins in the defense market to their realized 
commercial margins, clearly impacts the calculations of commercial contractors as to whether to 
enter that market.   
The first financial barrier for commercial firms is the ability to obtain financing to start a 
business in the federal market.  Representatives of the financial community (private equity, 
venture capital, Wall Street analysts, and banks) had very few positive things to say about the 
federal marketplace—profits are too low, risks are too high, markets are non-competitive and 
locked up.  Many firms described the financial capital environment as one that enforced a need 
to pay out investors in a 3–5 year time frame.  Expected government contracting returns simply 
do not generate the revenue or response times that would interest most venture capitalists.   
A few Silicon Valley entrepreneurs funded one emerging contractor when it could not obtain 
venture capital funding. This was described as a way of proving that government contracting 
could be done profitably.  While this company has been successful in winning contracts, it is by 
                                                
16 Interview with authors. 
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no means certain that the company will make the type of returns that most Silicon Valley firms 
are expected to make. Further, the company is now branching out into the commercial market 
where returns are greater.   
Banking institutions do not seem interested in lending until a signed contract is in hand, and even 
then, there are no guarantees, as “even with a signed contract, banks like to see independent 
equity investors risking their capital first” before lending.17  Given the lengthy procurement 
process, firms would be expected to self-finance during any start-up period, an option that may 
be well beyond the financial means of most firms, particularly new, small commercial 
businesses.   
Even those larger commercial companies that have made the decision to internally invest the 
capital needed to break into the defense market often leave disappointed.  A consultant recalled 
one of his clients saying, upon leaving the defense business, “money can’t wait.”  The inordinate 
time required for the DoD to make a procurement decision is sometimes too long for firms to tie 
up their money while waiting for a decision. Budget uncertainties (the threat of sequestration and 
government shut downs do not represent a tempting business environment), the incessant search 
for information necessary to respond to requests for information (RFIs) or draft requests for 
proposal (RFPs), and the lack of new programs on the horizon, increase the uncertainty.   
Even for those firms that have successfully obtained development contracts, the ability to 
transition to a real program is getting harder and harder, as the “valley of death” (the time 
between development and program initiations) is getting wider and wider. There is a fear among 
contractors that the DoD is stringing them out.  There was also an expressed concern that the 
services are increasingly protecting their organic capabilities, as more and more programs are 
stopped short of competitive opportunities.  To some it appears that the government seems to be 
using the pre-solicitation phases as an information-gathering exercise to support its organic 
work. This information collected from industry appears to be passing to the service laboratories 
and depots who then undertake the efforts.  Those firms that have been successful in rapidly 
transitioning capability to the war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan face limited opportunities to be 
                                                
17 Interview with authors. 
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funded for long-term sustainment or transitioning to a larger force. These capabilities will likely 
be lost if not funded.  Oftentimes, firms face a bundling of requirements that only a prime could 
win.  In this situation, a company must face the hard decisions of choosing the right teammate 
and trying to assess whether that teammate will actually subcontract work or choose to do the 
work in-house.   
These market risks, combined with customer risk (a euphemism for the DoD’s poor business 
practices), are extremely high for many firms.  The financial community has a great 
understanding of these risks and will lend or invest accordingly.  When taken in tandem, market 
risks and the perception that the DoD is seeking ways to drive margins down, make the 
government market even less attractive to private financing which, in turn, creates even larger 
barriers to commercial companies entering the DoD market. While profit concerns are generally 
focused on traditional defense contractors, non-traditional contractors’ views of the market make 
these trends relevant.  Thus, the perceived issue of the DoD’s “war on profits” needs closer 
scrutiny.   
As provided in the FAR, federal acquisition policy expressly recognizes the importance of the 
contractor’s ability to earn reasonable returns on business with the government, stating: “It is in 
the government’s interest to offer contractors opportunities for financial rewards sufficient to 
stimulate efficient contract performance, attract the best capabilities of qualified large and small 
business concerns to government contracts, and maintain a viable industrial base” (FAR Part 15).  
The FAR goes on to state,  
Both the government and contractors should be concerned with profit as a motivator of efficient and 
effective contract performance. Negotiations aimed merely at reducing prices by reducing profit, without 
proper recognition of the function of profit, are not in the government’s interest. The negotiation of 
extremely low profits, use of historical averages, or automatic application of predetermined percentages to 
total estimated costs do not provide proper motivation for optimum contract performance. (FAR Part 15)  
The FAR language is explicit and unequivocal.  Nevertheless, there are abundant examples of 
recent acquisition trends and policies that have attacked the profit and fee portions of traditional 
defense contractor’s prices, either through the elimination of fees on certain cost elements or by 
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negotiation strategies impacting overall returns on government contracts.  In addition, proposed 
policy changes that are aimed at forcing business system improvements and delaying fees until 
contract completion would significantly impede government contract cash flow, a critical part of 
the value proposition when doing business with the government. Finally, for R&D, acquisition 
policy trends now tend to favor cost-share, no-fee, or firm-fixed-price contracts, making full 
compensation for the development of government-unique technologies virtually impossible. The 
combination of lower margins in development, a higher percentage of development programs 
compared to full rate production, and the uncertainty of capturing higher margins in the 
production phase is increasingly making defense an unattractive market. 
DoD acquisition officials have emphasized repeatedly that they are not looking for ways to 
impact contractor profitability—just their costs. One DoD procurement official said that the 
Pentagon is concerned with cost reduction, not margin reduction, and that he would be surprised 
if profitability went down, even as spending is decreased.  He stated, “It wouldn’t bother us at all 
if operating margins go up, so long as we’re paying less. We want to spend 90 and have them 
make 15, we don’t want to spend 105 and have them make 15” (Fryer-Biggs, 2011).  
Despite protestations from senior DoD executives that they are not striving to marginalize 
profits, representatives from the traditional defense industry believe acquisition trends focused 
on elements of profitability, including changes to contract cash flow and policies for R&D 
funding, will have negative consequences for the government and the industrial base as 
contractors and investors shift resources away from unprofitable government business.  
Industry has repeatedly expressed its concerns to the DoD about attempts to drive down costs by 
arbitrarily reducing elements of cost and corresponding profit.  Squeezing profits undermines 
industry’s ability to invest in new technologies.  As with other industries, defense contractors 
must compete in the marketplace for labor, capital, and other resources. Maintaining a fair return 
on its contracts allows industry to compete for needed resources, provide economic value to its 
investors, cover legitimate business costs that are not recognized as allowable by the 
government, and continue to provide its customers with quality products.  Even more applicable 
to this study is that these defense-unique returns serve as a baseline benchmark and data point for 
rates of return that commercial firms would be expected to obtain in the defense market. 
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Overall, the defense industry’s profitability lags significantly behind its industrial peers.  In 
February 2009, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), under contract to the DoD, released a 
report entitled Defense Department Profit and Contract Finance Policies and Their Effects on 
Contract and Contractor Performance, which found that the margins for the defense industry 
were lower than for companies in other sectors. 
A recent comparison of company margins depicted in Figure 11 reinforces this trend.  Defense 
industry margins are lower than comparable capital goods industries, although they did better 
than the auto industry in its run up to its recent financial difficulties.  Defense services 
contractors seem to have similar, or at times, even a bit higher margins than their commercial 
counterparts.  Still, if the DoD seeks to attract commercial expertise, it must be noted that 
margins in the information technology industry and other commercial sectors are much higher 
than in the defense or capital goods sectors. 
What is most important about these numbers is that the DoD is likely going to have to pay at this 
higher level in order to gain, or maintain, the interest of the commercial contractors. If it is not 
willing to accept double-digit margins in some industry sectors, then it will likely not get the 
benefits of those firms' technologies, products, or expertise.  The perception by industry that the 
government has embarked on a “war on profits,” even if it is only against traditional defense 
contractors, will have a cost.  This perception is widespread and contributes to the conclusion in 
the financial community that the defense market is not a good market to invest in for new 
entrants.  Addressing this perception is necessary to avoid rapidly limiting the DoD’s available 
supplier pool and altering, to some measurable degree, the quality of the products they will be 
able to buy. 
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Figure 11: Defense and Related Industry Profit Margins, 2007–201218 
 
                                                
18 Data provided by Capital Alpha. 
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Figure 12: Information Technology Profit Margins, 2007–2012 
 
A potentially even greater profit deterrent to commercial companies doing business with the 
DoD is the growing realization that the contracting community and audit agencies no longer 
recognize that a commercial company is allowed to continue to gain profit on its own R&D that 
modifies its commercial items to meet the DoD’s needs.  There have been reports that the DoD is 
attempting to count commercial company R&D as a one-time cost, and therefore a reasonable 
profit is only allowed on that cost for one year.  This will have a chilling effect on future 
commercial efforts to modify these products to meet DoD needs, as the calculation to make that 
original investment is based on a long-term return (as shown by the growing—and high—profits, 
in the commercial IT business, in Figure 12).  If this potential policy change is enacted across the 
DoD enterprise, commercially funded R&D directed at DoD solutions will rapidly evaporate.   
Intellectual Property Barriers 
Intellectual property rights are the basis for encouraging innovation in a market economy. As one 
observer noted, “Individuals and institutions also need the proper incentives to be innovative; 
these incentives may be provided by the marketplace (e.g., to make profits), by the organizations 
in which individuals work (e.g., to get a promotion and recognition), and by the government 
regulations and tax structure (e.g., to invest in R&D; Reamer, p.1, 2010). A company’s 
intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are invaluable resources, central to a 
contractor’s ability to innovate and compete for government and commercial business. If 
contractors are expected to invest resources and know-how into the next-generation DoD 
platforms, including incorporating commercially developed technology and products, they 
should be able to retain exclusive rights to the resulting data.  However, many in industry 
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expressed concerns that some in Congress and the DoD are beginning to take the view that a 
contractor should be required to commit valuable intellectual capital to programs that, if 
successful, could result in the transfer of that IP to a contractor’s competitors. This could also 
happen with traditional defense firms, on a one-off basis, but it is not the type of intellectual 
property/technical data rights regime that will keep many true commercial contractors involved 
for long. 
Industry has long supported laws that allow contractors to retain control of their intellectual 
property rights.  Under existing law, technical data rights determinations on government 
contracts are primarily based on the source of funding used to “develop” an item or process to 
which technical data pertain. This enables contractors to make data rights determinations 
concurrent with technology development, including those occurring under IR&D and bid and 
proposal (B&P) projects. 
Many contractors employ proprietary and commercial manufacturing processes and technology 
in their performance of DoD contracts. Leveraging proprietary and commercial best practices 
and technology, developed exclusively at private expense, is more efficient, reduces overall 
costs, and enables the DoD to benefit from commercial investments made from company profit, 
and other private investments made by the private sector. Without placing limitations on the 
scope of data which could be ordered on a deferred basis, and released or disclosed outside the 
government to contractors, commercial vendors, and other non-standard suppliers, risk the 
possibility that the DoD can order—at any time—the delivery of technical data that has merely 
been “utilized” in performance of a DoD contract. This could include limited rights data and 
other commercial proprietary data, such as detailed manufacturing and process data.  In some 
cases, the associated risks with providing or risking exposure of such data to the government will 
outweigh the benefits for commercial vendors to pursue DoD business. In other cases, 
contractors with substantial commercial and military portfolios may reconsider the extent to 
which they leverage cutting-edge commercial processes and technology improvements across 
their military programs. This would lead to situations with unintended consequences in which the 
DoD is unable to access valuable, breakthrough technologies that are available in the commercial 
marketplace. 
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Industry has repeatedly voiced its concerns with legislative attempts to deny contractor’s 
proprietary technical data rights, and to force the release or disclosure of a contractor’s technical 
data pertaining to items or processes developed exclusively at private expense.  Over the years, 
industry has maintained that enacting new (more open) technical data rights laws would create 
significant uncertainty regarding data rights determinations, discourage private sector technology 
investment, and impair continued government access to breakthrough technologies developed in 
the private sector. These negative consequences could not be reasonably mitigated and would 
outweigh any benefit to the government.  In recent years, there have been several legislative 
changes addressing DoD technical data rights.  The most recent was in section 815 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012.  The impending rule 
implementing this new law has created great uncertainty for the traditional defense sector and, 
particularly, to the commercial companies that currently provide commercial solutions, either 
directly to the DoD or through traditional primes.  Depending on how this rule is constructed, it 
could have a significant impact on commercial company participation in DoD contracts. 
Another concern expressed by industry is that even without a new rule on technical data rights, 
the DoD has maintained an aggressive policy on the delivery of technical data as a condition of 
doing business with the Department by, for example, making delivery of technical data a source 
selection criteria. This policy of assigning heavy weighting to ceding of unlimited rights in data 
in source selection decisions certainly violates the spirit, if not the prohibition, in 10 U.S.C. 
2320(a)(2)(F) against requiring a contractor or subcontractor (or a prospective contractor or 
subcontractor), as a condition of being responsive to a solicitation or as a condition for the award 
of a contract, to sell or otherwise relinquish to the United States any rights in technical data 
beyond specified limited rights.   
While the DoD wants to accelerate innovation and encourage the entry of new competitors, RFPs 
often insist that the contractor provide technical data and software developed at private expense, 
thus undermining the incentive for contractor innovation and erecting another barrier for 
commercial companies contemplating entry into the government market.  Finally, concerns were 
raised about how the DoD will handle a massive influx of proprietary information: How will it 
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be stored; will the data be secure; will it be handled properly; and will it not be inadvertently 
released? 
Security Requirements 
At the time of the Section 800 Panel report (DoD Acquisition Law Advisory Board, 1993), the 
Post–Cold-War globalization of the commercial supply chain had not yet taken place.  Export 
controls were not considered a significant barrier in the Panel report to commercial contractors 
doing business with the federal government, and while FOCI measures in the Exon-Florio Act 
were mentioned, this was also not a significant finding. Events since this time have raised the 
importance of these issues in commercial company calculations. 
The expiration of the Export Administration Act (EAA) in 1994 began a debate that has yet to 
conclude on the proliferation of U.S. dual-use commercial technology.  The difficulties of 
reaching a consensus on this issue has led to a 20-year-long exercise of the EAA not being 
reauthorized and dual-use exports being controlled (under the president’s authority under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act).  The unauthorized transfer of space launch 
knowledge to the Chinese in the 1990s resulted in 1999 legislation transferring control of 
commercial space technology to the Munitions List.  A Clinton administration effort to reform 
export controls in the late 1990s did not achieve appreciable results in this environment.  
The events of 9/11 began a further tightening of U.S. export controls implementation and 
execution.  The last two years of the Bush administration saw some export control reform, 
focused on establishing defense cooperation treaties between the United States and the UK, and 
one with Australia.  The Obama administration has been more successful in achieving export 
control reform—first, by obtaining congressional approval for commercial satellite technologies 
to switch back from being ITAR-controlled, and, secondly, by beginning the process of 
scrubbing the munitions list to provide higher walls around fewer items.  
Still, the underlying negative incentives that have developed around several decades of 
increasingly tightened export policies have left its mark on the decision-making process of 
commercial firms.  There is great apprehension in the leadership of commercial companies that 
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having a product “tainted” by ITAR would keep it from being exported.  There are several 
strategies to avoid this ITAR taint.  The first is to never do business with the U.S. government.  
The second is to refrain from selling a product to the U.S. government until that product has 
wide distribution in the commercial marketplace.  A third strategy is to shift these kinds of 
technologies and product developments overseas and allow overseas R&D funds to mature both 
the technology and the product.  As firms become more and more globalized, with operations 
around the world, it is easier for firms to make these kinds of investment decisions prior to the 
development of a technology or a product.  Barring a significant change in export control laws 
and their implementation, these factors will continue to impact many commercial firms’ 
investments and government contracting decisions. 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process that reviews the 
national security implications of potential foreign ownership of U.S. companies has its own 
interesting ramifications for commercial companies.  At some point, it may be in the interest of 
companies to be bought by another company.  Whether this leads to greater shareholder value, 
market share, or efficiencies is unimportant for this analysis.  What is important is the incentive 
that is created: The more companies that are interested in buying a firm, the better price they are 
likely to get in the market.  Thus, there is an interest in having foreign firms be potential suitors 
in any mergers and acquisition transactions.   
However, having a subset of the company working on defense applications will give rise to a 
potentially difficult CFIUS review, and, depending on the nationality of the company that is 
contemplating the purchase of this U.S. company, any purchase may require divestiture or some 
type of special security arrangement, or proxy board, to be established in order to move forward 
with the purchase.  This presents an interesting incentive structure for any U.S. firm.  Does it 
make sound business sense for a domestic company to not undertake U.S. defense business in 
order to become a more attractive target for foreign firms, or does the company decide to 
comingle its defense and commercial capabilities as a “poison pill” to make it more difficult to 
be bought by a foreign company?  
The need to obtain security clearances was another barrier to participation identified by a few 
companies, particularly smaller firms.  One small firm expressed frustration at the “Catch-22” of 
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needing cleared employees to be eligible to bid on certain contracts but not being allowed to pre-
clear any of them to be able to bid because clearances were only granted after winning the 
contract. The clearance process would also take a significant amount of time, which would make 
it difficult to immediately execute any contract win. 
Concerns about the risks from the globalization of the supply chain and information security 
have also created an atmosphere in the DoD that is less inclusive of commercial solutions. 
Concerns about information security (trap doors and other potential security risks inserted by 
unscrupulous overseas vendors) or counterfeit parts have called into question the security of the 
commercial supply chain.   
Both issues are causes for legitimate concern.  However, there is a deep concern by industry and 
outside observers that the DoD will overreact to these potential threats and adopt one-size-fits-all 
strategies when a more narrowly targeted approach is adequate.  Concerns were expressed that 
the DoD may provide incentives to recreate a military-unique supply chain that commercial 
firms cannot afford.  This was a particular concern in the electronics field, where the cost of 
trusted foundries for electronic components are prohibitively expensive for more than just the 
most sensitive applications. 
Despite a number of private sector concerns about computer information security and counterfeit 
parts, the commercial IT marketplace is not as robust as it should be for some applications. The 
key for the DoD is to delineate and discriminate those applications that require different military-
unique levels of security assurance and to rely on the commercial marketplace for those areas 
that aren’t as problematic. 
Still, there are lessons to be learned from the development of the commercial IT industry of the 
1950s and early 1960s that could be applicable to both the counterfeit parts and information 
security problems. The DoD’s need for a higher standard of requirements in this area could serve 
as an incubator for new technologies and solutions that could solve the DoD’s issues.  The key 
factor in attracting commercial firms to solve the DoD’s requirements would be a planned path 
for commercialization of any technology developed to meet DoD requirements.  This would help 
create a highly competitive commercial sector that’s able to take those products and apply them 
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to those commercial sectors (like banking and finance) that need higher levels of information 
security and supply chain assurance.   
For example, in the case of eradicating counterfeits in the supply chain, for most applications the 
Department could adopt current commercial standards.  For a select number of applications, the 
DoD may require more stringent supply chain procedures and technologies—just as it does with 
safety-critical aviation parts and nuclear applications.  As the Department looks to expand 
beyond these areas and lower overall compliance costs, it can incentivize the private sector to 
provide those solutions with a planned path to commerciality, so those firms can sell the same 
technology, or a commercial derivative technology, to those commercial sectors that may require 
more stringent counterfeit-parts solutions in the future. 
Unique Non-Commercial Acquisition Requirements and Oversight Structure 
The process for acquiring goods and services from the commercial marketplace, as established 
by FASA, has been sub-optimized by many legislative and regulatory changes made in recent 
years.  Most FAR Part 15 contracts include hundreds of clauses that impose costly government-
unique requirements, thus increasing the overall cost of acquisition.  The government had made 
progress in this area by simplifying and streamlining its terms and conditions for commercial 
products and services through the adoption of FAR Part 12 contracting principles.  However, the 
trend seems to be gravitating back to the increased use of FAR Part 15 contracts, which are 
inconsistent with commercial practices.  The result is that the government’s costs will increase 
while company investments in expensive technology improvements will decrease.   
Commercial companies are troubled by steady erosion in the government’s use of a streamlined 
approach to commercial item acquisition.  Regulatory creep in the form of additional 
government-unique requirements will negatively impact the DoD’s ability to obtain the latest 
commercial technologies at the lowest possible prices.  Examples of regulatory creep include the 
following: 
• required certified cost or pricing data for “noncommercial” modifications to 
commercial items; 
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• increased documentation requirements for commercial item determinations that 
may discourage buying commands from using commercial items; 
• increased use of government-unique specifications when alternate commercial 
products will meet government needs; 
• increased pressure to report Small Business Plan results at the contract, rather 
than enterprise level, which entails more administrative efforts and increases 
costs; 
• increased number of contract clauses that are not customarily used in the 
commercial marketplace; and 
• requiring information other than cost or pricing data for commercial items. 
Cost or Pricing Data: One of the major impediments to the acquisition of commercial items is 
the DoD’s continued reliance on cost data as the key determinant of price reasonableness, rather 
than adapting to commercial pricing conditions.  Commercial items produced by commercial 
firms are exempted from the requirements of the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) and the 
Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) because these firms do not have the capacity or financial 
incentive to establish unique government accounting compliance systems.  Compliance and 
accounting systems that are in place to meet commercial needs were determined by FASA to be 
adequate. 
Unfortunately, there appears to be a deep-rooted desire within the government oversight 
community to rely solely on elements of cost, and a growing belief that anyone selling to the 
government is ipso facto a “traditional defense contractor,” even if it is a commercial firm that 
sells a disproportionately small share of its products to the government.  The DoD is increasingly 
taking the position that primarily commercial firms should provide cost or pricing data to the 
government, and thus appears to be willing to set aside commercially available technology 
improvements and contracting improvements such as lower government-funded development 
costs, reduced cycle times, and advanced technical performance.   
This desire for more cost or pricing data seems to originate from the 2006 DoD Inspector 
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General report on commercial items, as was discussed earlier.19  The concern over the cost of 
sole-source follow-on buys of primarily commercial item spare parts seems to be leading to 
demands for cost or pricing information to be applied to a wider aperture of procurements, rather 
than the narrow set of procurements that should probably be of concern. Even within this narrow 
set of sole-source commercial item spare parts pricing issues, the DoD needs to first look at its 
buying practices to determine the source and magnitude of the problem before creating further 
barriers to the incorporation of commercial items into the Department on a grand scale. 
Are these spare parts issues the result of the Department’s inability to adequately plan for 
technology refresh and buy the latest commercial upgrades?  Is the increased cost of these spares 
a result of asking commercial companies on a one-off basis to produce spare parts that it no 
longer produces for the rest of the commercial marketplace?  Is the price increase a result of the 
commercial company having to make a production run of just a few parts in comparison to a 
production run where they had both DoD and commercial demand?  Why is the DoD in a sole-
source situation for its spare parts buys in the first place?  Is competition limited because it didn’t 
pay for the right to use the commercial firms’ IP, or is it a question of the cost being too high to 
qualify another supplier?  Are the profits that the DoD is concerned about really too high, based 
on comparable commercial industry benchmarks for industry developed products? 
On a related issue, the DoD remains concerned with the part of the commercial item definition 
that deals with “of a type” customarily used by and sold in substantial quantities to the general 
public.  To change this definition would remove a significant tool for the DoD to access the 
commercial market.  While the DoD declares that it is not intent upon discouraging 
predominantly commercial companies from participating in the federal contracting process, it has 
asserted that a number of traditional defense contractors have taken advantage of the “of a type” 
part of the definition in sole-source procurements.  To the contrary, there is a segment of the 
commercial industry that may be more accurately described as traditional commercial 
contractors.  These companies used the flexibility in FASA to comingle their production lines 
and took the Department seriously when it wanted civil–military integration of its industrial base 
to drive down costs.  This approach maximized opportunities for items developed for the 
                                                
19 The 2005 presentation to the Acquisition Advisory Panel by Henry Kleinknecht in the DoD IG Office on the inadequacy of price analysis for 
establishing price reasonableness also provides some insight about the oversight community’s concern about commercial item procurement.  
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commercial market to be offered to the DoD as a “dual-use” approach to the market (i.e., true 
civil–military integration).  In fact, there are numerous examples highlighting the success of the 
DoD’s use of commercial items in military programs.  
As one commercial contractor noted, 
It is vital that the government oversight community not abandon the original intent of acquisition 
reform.  The Section 800 report, and the ensuing FASA statute, has ultimately expanded the ways 
the DoD could and should access commercial technology in the marketplace.  Unfortunately, in 
the last two years, the DoD has focused on limiting the definition of a commercial item and 
expanding access to any and all cost or pricing data.  From the outside, this focus appears to have 
two goals: (1) removing any discretion or exercise of judgment from the contracting official; and 
(2) attacking profit margins as a way to lower costs.20 
The first goal abrogates the DoD’s responsibility to train its workforce to better understand 
commercial practices and price evaluation techniques.  That may represent the root cause of the 
DoD’s issues with commercial procurement.  The second goal is focused on the wrong metric by 
ignoring (1) the effect of competition on lowering costs; (2) the development costs incurred by 
industry vice DoD; (3) obsolescence costs incurred by industry vs. DoD; and (4) the risks 
absorbed by industry in a commercial procurement.   
Audits: Commercial contractors have raised government audits as a concern, since the audits of 
government-unique contractors begin to bleed into questions of commerciality and require the 
production of vast amounts of data and support that were not required in the past.  This new audit 
problem has a number of sources: the concerns in Congress about the effectiveness of DCAA 
and the retirement of seasoned auditors in the government. 
In 2008 and 2009, the GAO and Congress (House Armed Services Committee Defense Reform 
Panel, Commission on Wartime Contracting, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs) found that DCAA audit documentation did not support the reported 
opinions; DCAA supervisors dropped findings and changed audit opinions, without adequate 
audit evidence for their changes; and DCAA work papers did not show that sufficient work was 
                                                
20 From a written response to survey questions. 
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performed to support the audit opinions.  In hearings before the Wartime Commission, DCAA 
and DCMA were further charged with failure to work together to support audit 
recommendations.   
As a result of the charges, DCAA has taken a more aggressive approach to auditing, including 
such actions as refusal to meet with companies to discuss audit findings in advance of issuing a 
report, requests for more evidence at a lower level, and actions to withhold payments until 
auditor requests for documentation are satisfied and audits are completed. 
One factor that hinders the efficient execution of DoD contracts is that audits are taking much 
longer to complete, a situation exacerbated by the retirement of senior auditors and the influx of 
new and inexperienced personnel to take their place. Since the end of 2007, there has been a 15% 
net increase in the DCAA workforce as the agency strives to replace experienced personnel who 
are approaching retirement (Aerospace Industries Association [AIA], 2011). Seasoned auditors 
possess a highly technical and unique skill set associated with government contracting.  New, 
less-experienced workers are replacing those with a proven ability to exercise audit judgment 
based on comprehensive regulatory knowledge.  The loss of experienced auditors will result in 
less efficient oversight and contract administration and greater misunderstandings about the use 
of commercial contractors in developing and producing DoD systems.   
As a result of attrition, contractors are now being required to repeatedly train government 
personnel on the complex inner workings of their cost-estimating systems.  Due to workforce 
inadequacies, audits, according to industry, are taking an inordinate amount of time to complete, 
often requiring rework by auditors, and requiring greater focus and efforts by contractors.   
Industry is concerned with the amount of time spent during audits and negotiations deliberating 
whether the contractor is required to obtain cost or pricing data for items provided by 
subcontractors, particularly commercial contractors.  In fact, several traditional contractors 
reported that auditors were putting pressure on them (to include not certifying their financial 
systems) to “spec out” commercial contractors and replace them with more traditional 
subcontractors who could provide cost or pricing data.  In another case, DCAA auditors 
demanded that the contractor “obtain cost or pricing data for a $10 washer to be purchased under 
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an existing subcontract when the total value of the parts to be supplied by the washer 
subcontractor for the particular proposal exceeds $700,000” (AIA, p. 15, 2011).  
Unique Government Technical Requirements, Specifications, and Standards: The 2009 
Defense Science Board Task Force final report to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]), Buying Commercial: Gaining the 
Cost/Schedule Benefits for Defense Systems, specifically cited the challenges with certification 
and qualification of commercial technologies to meet military requirements (DSB, 2009). A 
major cost advantage in the use of many commercial-derivative systems is their adherence to 
published industry standards.  Time and again we were told of the requirements and test and 
evaluation communities in the services mandating redundant, extremely expensive testing 
procedures and the use of materials not used in the original commercial product.  These changes 
dramatically drove up the cost of the commercial solution and, in many cases, led to the 
cancellation of the program that, to a cynic, may have been the rationale for the requirements.   
While obviously there are needs for military-unique requirements, some DoD certification 
processes have been described as setting a “gold standard,” while others would argue that these 
processes lead to “gold-plated” requirements and technologies.  DoD leadership should 
recognize that some flexibility of technical and performance requirements, including 
certification, is needed to effectively and affordably balance schedule, cost, and performance. 
Some ideas that were expressed by commercial companies to remove barriers to the 
incorporation of COTS solutions by the current military qualifications and certification process 
included the OSD  
• standardizing the qualification and certification process and ensuring that the Program 
Offices and the Technical Authority agree on the process early, and 
• reviewing specialized standards that conflict with industry best practices to prevent 
wholesale design changes and time delays in major systems that incorporate 
commercial components. 
Domestic Source Preferences (Buy American): Another significant barrier to commercial 
product acquisitions are domestic source restrictions such as the Berry Amendment, Specialty 
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Metals restrictions, and the Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. §§ 8301 through 8305)—the major 
domestic preference statute governing procurement by the federal government.  Originally 
enacted in 1933, the Buy American Act is now raised more in the application of exemptions to 
the act to include the Trade Agreements Act; these include the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement, U.S. Memorandums of Understanding on defense trade with various allied 
countries, and treaties addressing free trade areas.  The result is a convoluted process, where 
significant gaps don’t always correspond to the realities of the commercial supply chain.  
Information technology producers are still having difficulties supplying compliant products 
because the Trade Agreements Act exemptions to the Buy American Act are inadequate.  Only a 
few years have passed since many commercial firms came to the brink of no longer supplying 
their products to the DoD, because of changes in the enforcement of the specialty metals 
provision that was once a part of the Berry Amendment (10 U.S.C. §§ 2533a and 2533b).  Only a 
new statutory construct and a forward-leaning regulatory implementation averted such a supply 
chain disaster.  Still, the laws in this area are confusing and serve as a barrier to commercial 
company participation in the DoD market. 
A 1996 study conducted by the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) pointed out that these 
domestic preference mandates are virtually unknown in the commercial world and, as such, are 
anathema to commercial suppliers.  While the LMI study focused on integrated circuits, its 
findings are still relevant to all commercial firms:  
Several clauses in government contracts serve to restrict the origin of supplies and components 
either to domestic or to certain specific treaty-determined country sources. These source 
restrictions have no counterpart in the commercial world and can cut-off DoD from a wide range 
of suppliers, including overseas plants of U.S. corporations (which are common in the IC 
industry). FASA does not address either the Buy American Act or the Trade Agreements Act, and 
so the barriers posed by these laws are still in place. (Gentsch, E. L., Peterson, D. J., & Webster, 
C. A., p. 1-10, 1996) 
Other Unique Government Requirements: There are many other unique processes that came 
up in our study.  These included the bid-protest process; contract disputes resolution; socio-
economic programs; billing and contractor payments issues; documentation, audit rights; pass 
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through requirements; overhead policies; contract types; and differing practices and regulations 
among the services.  
The protest process is one area of federal procurement that baffles many commercial contractors 
not experienced in conducting business with the government.  The ability to sue your customer 
on a routine—almost expected—basis has no counterpart in the commercial world. Imagine 
companies routinely suing their customers if they lost a commercial competition.  In the 
commercial marketplace, they probably wouldn’t be invited back to work for that company 
again, but in the government this is general practice—and, increasingly becoming part of a 
defense firms strategy (if it is not a winner of a competition, particularly if it is the incumbent, 
since a protest will delay the change).  Amazon, which by all definitions is currently a non-
traditional commercial contractor, has recently been trying to enter the federal space, but a 
successful protest overturned one of its first large contract awards.  After experiencing the 
incentive structure that is created by the government’s bid protest process, many commercial 
firms may decide that this is not the market to be in.  
Another area that continues to grow over the years is the number of government-imposed socio-
economic obligations contained in its contracts, including requirements related to affirmative 
action, a drug-free work place, subcontracting, and minimum employee wages. While Congress 
has streamlined contract terms and conditions applicable to commercial items, on occasion, 
socio-economic strictures surface in government contracts with commercial entities. The most 
recent new requirement cited by industry is the application of the Federal Funding 
Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) to commercial item contracts.  Another well-
intentioned socio-economic goal is the proposed FAR case addressing the ending of trafficking 
in persons—designed to implement E.O. 13627 and Title XVII of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. How these requirements are going to be implemented 
and applied to commercial item procurements remains to be seen.  
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VI. Tools to Access Non-Traditional Commercial Contractors 
Several tools have been successful in encouraging non-traditional commercial contractors’ 
participation in DoD acquisitions, and, in return, allowing the DoD access to the contractors’ 
technologies and expertise. These tools are market research, commercial item (FAR Part 12) 
contracting, Other Transactions Authority (OTA), rapid acquisition authorities, and the use of 
intermediaries—primes, large subsystems contractors, and resellers.  Regrettably, all of these 
methods are currently either under threat or underutilized in the current acquisition environment.  
However, a potentially promising new tool is the utilization of government venture capital 
initiatives.  
Market Research  
It may be difficult for the DoD to accept a commercial solution that meets only 80% of a 
requirement.  However, before embarking on any 10–15 year Major Defense Acquisition 
Program (MDAP) or Major Automated Information System (MAIS) program, the first step 
should be to ascertain whether there is anything already in the development pipeline that could 
even partially meet requirements within the immediate time frame at a lesser cost.  The effective 
use of market research is designed to do just that, as well as to raise the question of the 
acceptability of the “80% solution” to satisfactorily do the required job. 
The use of market research has been a statutory requirement since the 1984 enactment of the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA, 1984).  CICA required the use of market research and 
procurement planning in order to promote the use of competitive procedures in federal 
contracting.  FASA added the requirement that federal agencies conduct market research for any 
contract exceeding $100,000 (FASA, 1994).  The FASA implementing language was contained 
in the DoD’s 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and 
Major Automated Information System Acquisition Programs (OSD, 2002), and required that 
market research and analysis be conducted prior to launching any development effort, during the 
development effort, and prior to the preparation of any product description, to determine the 
availability and suitability of commercial and non-developmental items (NDIs).  5000.2-R was 
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rescinded in 2003 and the current 5000 series guidance has only a few references to market 
research.  FAR Part 10, however, prescribes policies and procedures related to market research in 
order to achieve the most appropriate method of acquiring supplies and services.  
One constant refrain heard during this study was that the DoD does a poor job of commercial 
market research and is not aware of, and does not actively seek, commercial alternatives.  There 
is no centralized function in the DoD, or the services, that advocates alternative commercial 
solutions or understands what is transpiring in many of the commercial industries that could 
serve the DoD.   
FAR Part 12   
FAR Part 12 (“Acquisition of Commercial Items”) implements the preference for the acquisition 
of commercial items, contained in FASA, by establishing acquisition policies most similar to 
those of the commercial marketplace and encouraging the acquisition of commercial items and 
components.  It stipulates that 
Agencies shall— 
(a) Conduct market research to determine whether commercial items or nondevelopmental items 
are available that could meet the agency’s requirements; 
(b) Acquire commercial items or nondevelopmental items when they are available to meet the 
needs of the agency; and 
(c) Require prime contractors and subcontractors at all tiers to incorporate, to the maximum extent 
practicable, commercial items or nondevelopmental items as components of items supplied to the 
agency. (FAR Part 12) 
The FASA statutory changes removed significant barriers to the federal government’s 
acquisition of commercial items.  The underlying presumption was that the government would 
apply terms and conditions consistent with customary commercial practice (FAR Part 12, 
52.212-4).  
Under FAR Part 12, commercial items are exempt from a range of government statutes and 
regulations.  This exemption has been the most successful tool in bringing in commercial 
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technologies and practices.  However, as noted in the barriers section of this report, concerns 
within the DoD acquisition policy and oversight communities about the underlying costs and 
profits made by commercial item contractors are threatening this model.   
Another threat to FAR Part 12 is the steady increase in contract clauses applicable to commercial 
contracting since the enactment of FASA.  FASA mandates that only clauses required by law or 
executive order as applicable to acquisitions of commercial items, or consistent with customary 
commercial practice, should be applicable to contracts for commercial items.  As one 
commercial contractor observed, “The FAR lists over 50 government-unique clauses that apply 
to contracts for commercial items, and the DFARS list currently consists of 31 clauses. This 
lengthy list of clauses is limiting streamlining approaches available under FAR Part 12.”21 
Several pending regulatory changes address issues such as technical data rights and counterfeit 
parts, and could further discourage commercial participation. “When FASA was initially 
implemented, there were approximately half as many regulatory clauses as are applicable today. 
With the proliferation of government-unique regulations, predominately commercial companies 
must choose whether to either expand their infrastructure to comply with these terms, or cease 
accepting prime contracts.”22   
As one leading observer of government contracting noted, “the difference between using FAR 
Part 12 and FAR Part 15 is narrowing and at some point it won’t really make a difference which 
authority one uses.”23 While some of these contract clauses have been added by statute, the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has been reluctant to use its authority to waive 
these statutes, new regulations, and executive branch policies.  
Other Transaction Authority (OTA) 
Other Transaction Authority (OTA) is a powerful tool that traces its origin to NASA’s Space Act 
of 1958 (Halchin, L. E., 2011). It is defined by a negative, as the authority to enter into 
transactions other than contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements.  This effectively allows an 
OTA to bypass all of the acquisition rules and regulations in place and allows government and 
                                                
21 Company statement in response to study survey questions. 
22 Ibid. 
23  Interview with authors.  
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industry to sit down with a clean sheet of paper to figure out which requirements should apply to 
an agreement between a contractor and the government.  The DoD gained this authority in 1989 
for DARPA research and development projects (subsequently expanded to other parts of the 
DoD), and in 1993 for prototype projects (10 U.S.C. 2371 and 10 U.S.C. 2371 note). In a 
December 1999 memorandum on the use of OTAs for prototype projects, the Under Secretary of 
Defense (AT&L) stated, 
OTA provides tremendous flexibility since instruments for prototype projects, awarded pursuant 
to this authority, generally are not subject to federal laws and regulations limited in applicability to 
procurement contracts.  It is DoD policy . . . to establish policies and programs that improve, 
streamline and strengthen DoD Component technology access and development programs, 
encourage open-market competition and technology-driven prototype efforts that offer increased 
military capabilities at lower total ownership costs and faster fielding times, and exploit the cost-
reduction potential of accessing innovative or commercially developed technologies. 
(USD[AT&L], 2001) 
Subsequently, it was realized that once a commercial firm completed a prototype demonstration, 
they would have difficulty taking the program into production, because the original legislation 
limited the OTA to only prototypes.  Thus, in 2004, the authorizing legislation was extended to 
cover production follow-ons to successful prototypes. 
Then a 2000 GAO report noted that many OTAs were being given to traditional military-unique 
contractors.  This led Congress in 2001 to amend the OTA prototype authority and limit 
applicability to the participation of “non-traditional” contractors (generally defined by their not 
having CAS-covered contracts; NDAA, 2001). Traditional CAS-covered contractors could 
receive an OTA but would be required to cost share with the government, in exchange for any 
waiver in procurement rules, or have a non-traditional contractor as a significant participant.  
Based on this change in statute, Congress looked at the OTA authority as a means to bring new 
participants into the DoD marketplace, rather than a means to gain new efficiencies from 
traditional defense contractors.  While a colloquy between Senators Bingaman, Nunn, and 
Warner seems to imply that using OTAs for traditional contractors was one of the original 
intentions of the legislation in 1993, Congress chose to narrow this application in 2001 
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(Congressional Record, 1993). The addition of the cost share language has reduced the incentive 
to use OTAs for more traditional contractors.  
The narrower definition (beyond the CAS criterion) of a non-traditional contractor meeting a 
$500,000 contract threshold has also had an impact on the use of this authority for some 
commercial companies. As a result, Congress modified the $500,000 threshold in section 866 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 to have the exception only apply to 
those contracts above $500,000 that were subject to TINA.  However, many non-traditional 
contractors enter the DoD marketplace under competitive Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) 
for small research and development contracts or similar competitive contract vehicles.  While 
these BAA’s awards are made competitively, there has not been “adequate price competition” for 
purposes of meeting the exemption from the requirement to provide certified cost or pricing data 
under subparagraph (a)(1) of FAR 15.403-1. Thus, these firms are no longer eligible for OTAs 
under the non-traditional definition. 
Congress raised further questions about OTAs when one was used to develop the Army’s Future 
Combat System (FCS). This OTA went to a traditional defense contractor but was justified 
because non-traditional robotics companies were participating in the OTA.  The congressional 
concerns raised about this OTA, and what was likely an over-reaction to these concerns in the 
Department, led to an additional scaling back of the use of OTA authority.  We heard from 
several non-traditional commercial companies that, from this time forward, OTAs began to lose 
support within the Department.  Since these companies would only conduct R&D with the DoD 
on an OTA basis, they no longer partnered with the DoD when these vehicles were allowed to 
lapse.   
As noted above, in 2004, Congress authorized a pilot OTA authority for the DoD to conduct 
limited production of systems beyond a prototype.  We could find no evidence that this authority 
has ever been used.  In discussions with non-traditional commercial contractors, they agreed that 
production OTAs would be a good idea (in fact, a requirement for them to bid on developing the 
prototype) but believed that the current culture at the DoD and the limitations in the statute have 
precluded the potential use of such authority.  Additionally, it is unclear whether limited 
production of some units of a subsystem of such an operational prototype would be allowed.  
 70 
The DoD should clarify whether this is the case and whether OTAs can be authorized for 
subcontracts.  If a determination is made that existing authority is lacking, legislation to expand 
OTA authority to address these two cases should be considered. 
OTA authority offers one of the best ways to access non-traditional contractors and was the 
vehicle that allowed the DoD to harness new technologies that it would not have been able to 
access through the traditional acquisition process. The rollback in its use has kept an entire class 
of commercial contractors and entities from supporting the Department in its attempts to address 
acquisition challenges. 
Rapid Acquisition Authority 
Section 811 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 
(Pub. Law 108-375) contained a provision granting the Secretary of Defense the authority to 
“waive any provision of law, policy, directive, or regulation that would unnecessarily impede the 
rapid acquisition and deployment of needed equipment to prevent combat fatalities.”  This 
legislation was designed to give the DoD the necessary authority to rapidly respond to urgent 
needs for capability to address contingency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the 
world as it addressed terrorist threats. 
As a result of these urgent and compelling needs, the DoD and the services developed a new 
rapid acquisition system outside of the formal acquisition structure mandated in the DoD 5000 
series of acquisition directives and instructions. This informal system pushed the technological 
envelope in areas necessary to meet changing wartime needs over the last decade.  These 
programs were relatively small and focused on deploying operational capability in a six-month to 
two-year time frame.  
These types of initiatives can serve several purposes.  The first is to more quickly deploy 
technology into the field and meet user requirements in a “compelling need” situation.  The 
second is to prove technology at a smaller unit level that could be potentially scalable and 
transferred into a major systems program.  A third outcome is that the short time frame to 
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deployment forces the agency to incorporate off-the-shelf (often commercial) technologies 
quickly into new types of capabilities.   
In April 2010, the GAO reported shortcomings in DoD processes for meeting urgent operational 
needs. According to the GAO (2010),  
DoD’s guidance for its urgent needs processes is dispersed and outdated. Further, DoD guidance 
does not clearly define roles and responsibilities for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all 
phases of those processes or incorporate all of the expedited acquisition authorities available to 
acquire joint urgent need solutions. Data systems for the processes lack comprehensive, reliable 
data for tracking overall results and do not have standards for collecting and managing data. In 
addition, the joint process does not include a formal method for feedback to inform joint 
leadership on the performance of solutions. In the absence of a management framework for its 
urgent needs processes, DoD lacks tools to fully assess how well its processes work, manage their 
performance, ensure efficient use of resources, and make decisions regarding the long term 
sustainment of fielded capabilities (GAO, 2010, p.10) 
A 2011 GAO review of the DoD’s progress in implementing recommendations and legislative 
reforms to the rapid acquisition process found that the DoD continued to have significant 
shortfalls and a “lack of a comprehensive Department-wide strategy [that] has created the risk 
that its efforts to acquire the latest technology will quickly become duplicative, overlapping and 
fragmented.” The GAO report claimed that the DoD lacked visibility over its own activities and 
could not provide a definitive number on how much it spends on Department-wide urgent-need 
efforts—a figure that the GAO estimated to be at least $76.9 billion (GAO, 2011). 
While there are obviously some issues that need to be addressed regarding rapid acquisition 
processes, including sustainment planning and funding, there have been some significant 
successes in deploying net-centric, unmanned, Counter-IED systems and MRAPs in a timely 
manner into the field, saving lives in wartime situations.  Rapid initiatives proved to be 
extremely successful in deploying commercial technologies and solutions to meet wartime needs.  
In fact, many commercial companies who were successful with a rapid acquisition have 
struggled to find their places in the 15–20-year DoD acquisition process.  A significant lesson 
learned from these efforts was the need for a short time frame, prior to deployment, as a way to 
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bring in commercial technologies and firms.  It would be a mistake if the GAO’s concerns were 
used as a justification for disbanding the rapid acquisition initiatives and forcing the services into 
the one-size-fits-all straightjacket of the traditional acquisition process.  
Use of Intermediaries   
If a commercial firm chooses to not deal directly with the government, selling through 
government-unique primes, large subsystems contractors and resellers have been alternative 
routes to enable the government to access these technologies and products.  Many COTS 
producers, who do not want to deal with the some of the potential liabilities associated with 
contracting directly with the government, tend to engage resellers for this market.   
In fact, as an unintended consequence of the growing difficulties associated with negotiating a 
FAR Part 12 contract, more commercial firms may elect to sell only as subcontractors, where the 
number of flow-down regulations is intended to be minimal. As long as the flow-down 
restrictions are limited to socio-economic requirements, there should be minimal administrative 
burden. However, a number of cases were cited illustrating the pressure that oversight agencies 
and contracting offices have brought to bear on prime contractors to justify their commerciality 
decisions with regards to their subcontractors. This trend could further erode the number of 
commercial products in systems as defense-unique contractors attempt to substitute military-
unique products for commercial ones.  
Still, the use of intermediaries might not be viewed as progress but rather a “workaround” that is 
also under threat from the questioning of prime contractor’s commerciality decisions. As one 
dual-use company stated, “Typically, it is more economical for the government to buy direct 
from the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs); however, to avoid these burdensome 
government-unique clauses, the commercial firm may elect to distribute its products only 
through prime contractors who are “government defense contractors.” This is exactly the 
scenario that FASA was trying to avoid. The stated goal of civil/military integration was to 
expand the defense industrial base to include commercial firms. The regulatory proliferation and 
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related oversight have minimized this tremendous opportunity.”24  There is no doubt that the use 
of intermediaries raises the cost of commercial items to the government as there is a markup to 
be paid for management and systems integration provided by these intermediaries, and whose 
additional value-added is the ability to comply with the government’s unique requirements.  
Government Venture Capital Initiatives 
Indications are that portions of the intelligence community may currently be more open than the 
DoD is to the use of commercial items and companies.  With the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA’s) stand-up of In-Q-Tel (a not-for-profit venture capital firm that invests in high-tech 
companies for the sole purpose of keeping the CIA and other intelligence agencies equipped with 
the latest in information technology), some believe that the CIA has a greater understanding of 
the capabilities of the commercial market for information network and security solutions.  While 
the intelligence community’s use of its acquisition authorities was outside the scope of this 
study, we did hear that there might exist some best practices and additional lessons to be learned 
from studying this experience. 
A useful area of further research is to assess the use of government-sponsored venture capital to 
help firms develop and bring their solutions into the government.  Many firms and observers 
gave high marks for the In-Q-Tel experience.  Interestingly, it may not be the money that In-Q-
Tel provides, but the vetting process that provides some certainty about what the government 
thinks is important to obtain from the commercial market.  In one sense, the intelligence 
community’s venture capital process may be an area in which the government is actually doing a 
good job in its commercial market research.  A major industry concern, when dealing with the 
government, is the uncertainty surrounding whether the government will commit to a product or 
service once it is developed.  In-Q-Tel, according to one financial representative, sparks the 
interest of the Silicon Valley firms and venture capital community because the intelligence 
community knows what they want and are willing to pay for it. One Silicon Valley firm we 
interviewed described the In-Q-Tel money as not being that important from a monetary 
perspective, but said that In-Q-Tel’s vetting process “gave us an ability to interact and learn 
                                                
24 Company statement in response to study survey questions. 
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where the customer wanted to take technology. This is something that the firm as an outsider 
would have never been able to access.”25 These firms also appear to be allowed to commercialize 
their experience; however, any assessment of In-Q-Tel’s policy on a “path to commercialization” 
was outside the scope of this study. 
While the Army and OSD have experimented with various venture capital initiatives they did not 
seem to have the same scope for follow-up contracts that the CIA’s version does, and this would 
be an interesting topic to explore in a future study.  
                                                
25 Interview with authors. 
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VII. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Non-traditional commercial contractors have played a significant role in supporting U.S. national 
security from the engagement of commercial manufacturers during World War II, to the joint 
development of the microelectronics industry in the late 1950–1960s.  The introduction of 
commercial advances from the information technology industry enabled the 1990’s “net-centric 
revolution in military affairs” that incorporated these technologies into DoD systems.  Military 
advances appear to be on the cusp of an unmanned vehicle and robotics revolution that is based 
on many of these same commercial technologies. 
As described in this report, despite initial successes, commercial acquisition has not become 
ingrained in the DoD acquisition culture and faces severe pushback on many fronts.  Based on 
the study results, the following conclusions can be made about the DoD’s ability to access 
commercial technologies and contractors: 
• Commercial markets and technologies will become ever more important to the DoD as its 
global share of R&D continues to decline.  Advances in commercial information 
technology, telecommunications, logistics, software, robotics, materials, manufacturing, 
sensor, energy, aerospace, maritime, and other technologies and business practices will 
continue to develop solutions that have military applications.  These technologies and 
business practices will be widely available, and military advantage will flow to those 
nations who can “run faster” and incorporate these technologies and practices rapidly into 
new systems and operations. 
• There is an overwhelming consensus that the commercial item acquisition reforms of the 
1990s never went as far as they should have to truly integrate the commercial 
marketplace into the DoD’s acquisition planning and implementation.  There have been 
successes (such as the incorporation of commercial information technology and the 
development of unmanned systems), but these successes often required the involvement 
of senior leadership to overcome a bureaucracy resistant to change. 
• Despite these successes, the acquisition environment at the DoD for non-traditional 
commercial contractors has eroded significantly in the last five to seven years.  DoD 
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leadership’s support for commercial item acquisition has declined and, as a result, 
financial, intellectual property, and market risks have grown for commercial companies 
doing business with the DoD, while procurement, security, and oversight barriers have all 
risen.  Successful tools to access commercial contractors (FAR Part 12 and OTA) have 
been seriously undermined by statute, regulation, or practice.  
• While a few commercial firms have left (or never entered) the defense market, many 
commercial firms are considering adjusting their structure in order to deal with the U.S. 
government. A large segment of commercial firms are already organized to either sell 
only through government-unique intermediaries or have created government-unique 
subsidiaries that are more reflective of traditional defense contractors in cost structure 
and innovation.  As a result, the industrial base structure is at risk of being returned to a 
primarily pre-1990s military-unique base (with fewer suppliers, due to Post–Cold War 
consolidation in the 1990s) supplemented by COTS providers who sell through resellers 
and provide no additional modifications to their products.  
• The DoD is currently obtaining adequate (although possibly not the best) commercial 
technology that it asks for, primarily through intermediaries and at a higher cost.  
Because of growing barriers, it risks falling behind in the future because the Department 
1) does not fully understand and/or distrusts the capabilities of the commercial 
marketplace; 
2) continues to construct new barriers to entry in the requirements, contracting, 
technology security, and test and evaluation processes that are not friendly to 
commercial solutions; 
3) does not understand how the commercial market works and how it is incentivized;  
4) does not use it well (with a particular risk in areas such as cyber security where 
commercial solutions will require more development than just COTS); and  
5) has created incentives for firms to not offer their technology to the DoD, not share 
their intellectual property with the government (for fear of having it released), or not 
invest in cutting-edge R&D in the United States but rather move this investment 
overseas.  Due to security concerns and current practices, this technology will remain 
out of the DoD’s reach. 
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Recommendations: If the DoD is to continue to access the benefits of the commercial 
marketplace, the following recommendations should be considered: 
Senior leadership in the Department of Defense needs to aggressively advocate for the 
acquisition of commercial technology and for the adoption and integration of commercial 
business practices.  This effort will require a long-term commitment, extending over several 
administrations.  A successful advocacy plan would include the following actions: 
1) Combat instances of requirements “gold-plating”—a process that continues to support the 
establishment and maintenance of military-unique requirements, standards, and practices.  
The requirements, standards, test and evaluation, and technology certification processes 
need to be reformed to alleviate tendencies to rely solely on military-unique solutions.  
Stronger legislation than the current preference for commercial items in 41 U.S.C. 3307 
may be required to ensure that commercial solutions are the primary baseline to be first 
considered, and to conduct a cost–benefit analysis before considering any military-unique 
solution or technology above and beyond current commercial performance thresholds. 
2) Re-establish incentives to effectively and robustly use existing authorities to access 
commercial firms for more than just COTS solutions. These solutions would correspond 
to Levels 2–8 in the DSB hierarchy outlined earlier. 
3) Ensure that DoD rapid acquisition organizations and capabilities are maintained and fully 
utilized as a means to field solutions (especially commercial ones) faster.   
4) Identify and implement “best commercial acquisition practices” (by commercial sector 
and DoD application) throughout the DoD enterprise.  Focus audit agency oversight 
efforts on benchmarking these governmental and private sector best commercial 
acquisition practices. Audit agencies need to question evaluation criteria that discriminate 
against commercial items; otherwise, the efforts of the oversight community risk 
becoming the mechanism to increase DoD acquisition costs and reduce innovation.  The 
GAO conducted similar best practices work in the 1990s and early 2000 time frame, but 
little has been done since that time. 
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5) Encourage the establishment of “non-traditional commercial entities” in private sector 
firms that are exempt from unique government and DoD rules and oversight. These 
entities could be entire firms or subsidiaries within a parent firm that would only sell to 
the DoD products and services that are commercial items, as defined in FAR Part 12 or 
through an OTA.  
6) Expand the use of Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements within existing 
authority and seek legislation, if necessary, to better use OTA authority for production 
and to access non-traditional commercial subcontractors under a FAR Part 15 contract 
with a traditional defense prime contractor.   
7) Improve market research in the Department and services to better understand what 
commercial capabilities are available in the market.  To consolidate expertise, separate 
organizations may need to be established to conduct market research, advocate, guide, 
and (if needed) purchase commercial items for the services and Defense agencies. 
8) Plan for a path to commerciality for non-traditional contractors when leveraging the 
commercial market for DoD-unique requirements.  Where the DoD needs a higher 
standard or requirement than currently being demanded in the commercial marketplace 
(for example in cyber security, or for a secure supply chain), incentivize firms with a 
promised path to commercialization that would allow intellectual property to be protected 
and used in the commercial market.  
9) Establish a new Section 800 Panel to recommend specific legislative, regulatory, and 
policy changes that inhibit the acquisition of commercial items. This new effort should 
especially review the implications of the globalization of R&D and the commercial 
supply chain to the DoD’s ability to acquire this technology. 
10) Periodically benchmark the costs of compliance with government and military-unique 
requirements, laws, regulations, practices, certifications, and standards.  While past 
studies (Coopers and Lybrand, 1994; Crook, Ketchen, Combs, & Patterson, 2012) have 
attempted to measure the costs of regulatory compliance from the contracting process, 
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there are many unique drivers of cost in the defense acquisition system, such as the 
standards and certification processes, that need to be identified and continually held up to 
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Appendix 1: Statutes Related to Commercial Items26 
 
 
COMMERCIAL ITEM PREFERENCE 
 
41 USC 3307: Preference for commercial items 
Text contains those laws in effect on October 11, 2013 
From Title 41-PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Subtitle I-Federal Procurement Policy 
Division C-Procurement 
CHAPTER 33-PLANNING AND SOLICITATION 
 
§3307. Preference for commercial items 
(a) Relationship of Provisions of Law to Procurement of Commercial Items.- 
(1) This division.-Unless otherwise specifically provided, all other provisions in this 
division also apply to the procurement of commercial items. 
(2) Laws listed in federal acquisition regulation.-A contract for the procurement of a 
commercial item entered into by the head of an executive agency is not subject to a 
law properly listed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation pursuant to section 1906 of 
this title. 
 
(b) Preference.-The head of each executive agency shall ensure that, to the 
maximum extent practicable- 
(1) requirements of the executive agency with respect to a procurement of supplies 
or services are stated in terms of- 
(A) functions to be performed; 
(B) performance required; or 
(C) essential physical characteristics; 
 
(2) those requirements are defined so that commercial items or, to the extent that 
commercial items suitable to meet the executive agency's needs are not available, 
nondevelopmental items other than commercial items may be procured to fulfill those 
requirements; and 
(3) offerors of commercial items and nondevelopmental items other than 
commercial items are provided an opportunity to compete in any procurement to fill 
those requirements. 
 
(c) Implementation.-The head of each executive agency shall ensure that 
procurement officials in that executive agency, to the maximum extent practicable- 
(1) acquire commercial items or nondevelopmental items other than commercial 
items to meet the needs of the executive agency; 
(2) require that prime contractors and subcontractors at all levels under contracts 
of the executive agency incorporate commercial items or nondevelopmental items 
                                                
26 Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the United States House of Representatives, United States Code, http://uscode.house.gov 
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other than commercial items as components of items supplied to the executive 
agency; 
(3) modify requirements in appropriate cases to ensure that the requirements can 
be met by commercial items or, to the extent that commercial items suitable to meet 
the executive agency's needs are not available, nondevelopmental items other than 
commercial items; 
(4) state specifications in terms that enable and encourage bidders and offerors to 
supply commercial items or, to the extent that commercial items suitable to meet the 
executive agency's needs are not available, nondevelopmental items other than 
commercial items in response to the executive agency solicitations; 
(5) revise the executive agency's procurement policies, practices, and procedures 
not required by law to reduce any impediments in those policies, practices, and 
procedures to the acquisition of commercial items; and 
(6) require training of appropriate personnel in the acquisition of commercial items. 
 
(d) Market Research.- 
(1) When to be used.-The head of an executive agency shall conduct market 
research appropriate to the circumstances- 
(A) before developing new specifications for a procurement by that executive 
agency; and 
(B) before soliciting bids or proposals for a contract in excess of the simplified 
acquisition threshold. 
 
(2) Use of results.-The head of an executive agency shall use the results of market 
research to determine whether commercial items or, to the extent that commercial 
items suitable to meet the executive agency's needs are not available, 
nondevelopmental items other than commercial items are available that- 
(A) meet the executive agency's requirements; 
(B) could be modified to meet the executive agency's requirements; or 
(C) could meet the executive agency's requirements if those requirements were 
modified to a reasonable extent. 
 
(3) Only minimum information required to be submitted.-In conducting market 
research, the head of an executive agency should not require potential sources to 
submit more than the minimum information that is necessary to make the 
determinations required in paragraph (2). 
 
(e) Regulations.- 
(1) In general.-The Federal Acquisition Regulation shall provide regulations to 
implement this section, sections 102, 103, 105, and 110 of this title, and chapter 140 
of title 10. 
(2) Contract clauses.- 
(A) Definition.-In this paragraph, the term “subcontract” includes a transfer of 
commercial items between divisions, subsidiaries, or affiliates of a contractor or 
subcontractor. 
(B) List of clauses to be included.-The regulations prescribed under paragraph 
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(1) shall contain a list of contract clauses to be included in contracts for the 
acquisition of commercial end items. To the maximum extent practicable, the list 
shall include only those contract clauses that are- 
(i) required to implement provisions of law or executive orders applicable to 
acquisitions of commercial items or commercial components; or 
(ii) determined to be consistent with standard commercial practice. 
 
(C) Requirements of prime contractor.-The regulations shall provide that the 
Federal Government shall not require a prime contractor to apply to any of its 
divisions, subsidiaries, affiliates, subcontractors, or suppliers that are furnishing 
commercial items any contract clause except those that are- 
(i) required to implement provisions of law or executive orders applicable to 
subcontractors furnishing commercial items or commercial components; or 
(ii) determined to be consistent with standard commercial practice. 
 
(D) Clauses that may be used in a contract.-To the maximum extent practicable, 
only the contract clauses listed pursuant to subparagraph (B) may be used in a 
contract, and only the contract clauses referred to in subparagraph (C) may be 
required to be used in a subcontract, for the acquisition of commercial items or 
commercial components by or for an executive agency. 
(E) Waiver of contract clauses.-The Federal Acquisition Regulation shall provide 
standards and procedures for waiving the use of contract clauses required 
pursuant to subparagraph (B), other than those required by law, including 
standards for determining the cases in which a waiver is appropriate. 
 
(3) Market acceptance.- 
(A) Requirement of offerors.-The Federal Acquisition Regulation shall provide 
that under appropriate conditions the head of an executive agency may require 
offerors to demonstrate that the items offered- 
(i) have achieved commercial market acceptance or been satisfactorily 
supplied to an executive agency under current or recent contracts for the same 
or similar requirements; and 
(ii) otherwise meet the item description, specifications, or other criteria 
prescribed in the public notice and solicitation relating to the contract. 
 
(B) Regulation to provide guidance on criteria.-The Federal Acquisition 
Regulation shall provide guidance to ensure that the criteria for determining 
commercial market acceptance include the consideration of- 
(i) the minimum needs of the executive agency concerned; and 
(ii) the entire relevant commercial market, including small businesses. 
 
(4) Provisions relating to types of contracts.- 
(A) Types of contracts that may be used.-The Federal Acquisition Regulation 
shall include, for acquisitions of commercial items- 
(i) a requirement that firm, fixed price contracts or fixed price with economic 
price adjustment contracts be used to the maximum extent practicable; 
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(ii) a prohibition on use of cost type contracts; and 
(iii) subject to subparagraph (B), authority for use of a time-and-materials or 
labor-hour contract for the procurement of commercial services that are 
commonly sold to the general public through those contracts and are purchased 
by the procuring agency on a competitive basis. 
 
(B) When time-and-materials or labor-hour contract may be used.-A time-and-
materials or labor-hour contract may be used pursuant to the authority referred to 
in subparagraph (A)(iii)- 
(i) only for a procurement of commercial services in a category of commercial 
services described in subparagraph (C); and 
(ii) only if the contracting officer for the procurement- 
(I) executes a determination and findings that no other contract type is 
suitable; 
(II) includes in the contract a ceiling price that the contractor exceeds at its 
own risk; and 
(III) authorizes a subsequent change in the ceiling price only on a 
determination, documented in the contract file, that it is in the best interest of 
the procuring agency to change the ceiling price. 
 
(C) Categories of commercial services.-The categories of commercial services 
referred to in subparagraph (B) are as follows: 
(i) Commercial services procured for support of a commercial item, as 
described in section 103(5) of this title. 
(ii) Any other category of commercial services that the Administrator for 
Federal Procurement Policy designates in the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
for the purposes of this subparagraph on the basis that- 
(I) the commercial services in the category are of a type of commercial 
services that are commonly sold to the general public through use of time-
and-materials or labor-hour contracts; and 
(II) it would be in the best interests of the Federal Government to authorize 
use of time-and-materials or labor-hour contracts for purchases of the 
commercial services in the category. 
 
(5) Contract quality requirements.-Regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) 
shall include provisions that- 
(A) allow, to the maximum extent practicable, a contractor under a commercial 
items acquisition to use the existing quality assurance system of the contractor as 
a substitute for compliance with an otherwise applicable requirement for the 
Federal Government to inspect or test the commercial items before the 
contractor's tender of those items for acceptance by the Federal Government; 
(B) require that, to the maximum extent practicable, the executive agency take 
advantage of warranties (including extended warranties) offered by offerors of 
commercial items and use those warranties for the repair and replacement of 
commercial items; and 
(C) set forth guidance regarding the use of past performance of commercial 
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items and sources as a factor in contract award decisions. 




COMMERCIAL ITEM DEFINITION 
 
41 USC 103: Commercial item 
Text contains those laws in effect on October 11, 2013 
From Title 41-PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Subtitle I-Federal Procurement Policy 
Division A-General 
CHAPTER 1-DEFINITIONS 
SUBCHAPTER I-SUBTITLE DEFINITIONS 
 
§103. Commercial item 
In this subtitle, the term “commercial item” means- 
(1) an item, other than real property, that- 
(A) is of a type customarily used by the general public or by nongovernmental 
entities for purposes other than governmental purposes; and 
(B) has been sold, leased, or licensed, or offered for sale, lease, or license, to 
the general public; 
 
(2) an item that- 
(A) evolved from an item described in paragraph (1) through advances in 
technology or performance; and 
(B) is not yet available in the commercial marketplace but will be available in the 
commercial marketplace in time to satisfy the delivery requirements under a 
Federal Government solicitation; 
 
(3) an item that would satisfy the criteria in paragraph (1) or (2) were it not for- 
(A) modifications of a type customarily available in the commercial marketplace; 
or 
(B) minor modifications made to meet Federal Government requirements; 
 
(4) any combination of items meeting the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or 
(5) that are of a type customarily combined and sold in combination to the general 
public; 
(5) installation services, maintenance services, repair services, training services, 
and other services if- 
(A) those services are procured for support of an item referred to in paragraph 
(1), (2), (3), or (4), regardless of whether the services are provided by the same 
source or at the same time as the item; and 
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(B) the source of the services provides similar services contemporaneously to 
the general public under terms and conditions similar to those offered to the 
Federal Government; 
 
(6) services offered and sold competitively, in substantial quantities, in the 
commercial marketplace based on established catalog or market prices for specific 
tasks performed or specific outcomes to be achieved and under standard commercial 
terms and conditions; 
(7) any item, combination of items, or service referred to in paragraphs (1) to (6) 
even though the item, combination of items, or service is transferred between or 
among separate divisions, subsidiaries, or affiliates of a contractor; or 
(8) a nondevelopmental item if the procuring agency determines, in accordance 
with conditions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, that the item was developed 
exclusively at private expense and has been sold in substantial quantities, on a 
competitive basis, to multiple State and local governments. 
(Pub. L. 111–350, §3, Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3679.) 
 
COTS ITEM DEFINITION 
 
41 USC 104: Commercially available off-the-shelf item 
Text contains those laws in effect on October 11, 2013 
From Title 41-PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Subtitle I-Federal Procurement Policy 
Division A-General 
CHAPTER 1-DEFINITIONS 
SUBCHAPTER I-SUBTITLE DEFINITIONS 
§104. Commercially available off-the-shelf item 
In this subtitle, the term “commercially available off-the-shelf item”- 
(1) means an item that- 
(A) is a commercial item (as described in section 103(1) of this title); 
(B) is sold in substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace; and 
(C) is offered to the Federal Government, without modification, in the same form 
in which it is sold in the commercial marketplace; but 
 
(2) does not include bulk cargo, as defined in section 40102(4) of title 46, such as 
agricultural products and petroleum products. 
(Pub. L. 111–350, §3, Jan. 4, 2011, 124 Stat. 3679.)
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Appendix 2: The “Perry Memo” 
 
29 June 9 
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretaries of Defense Comptroller Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) 
General Counsel Inspector General Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Directors of 
the Defense Agencies Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command 
 
SUBJECT: Specifications & Standards - A New Way of Doing Business 
 
To meet future needs, the Department of Defense must increase access to commercial state-of-
the-art technology and must facilitate the adoption by its suppliers of business processes 
characteristic of world class suppliers. In addition, integration of commercial and military 
development and manufacturing facilitates the development of dual-use processes and products 
and contributes to an expanded industrial base that is capable of meeting defense needs at lower 
costs. 
 
I have repeatedly stated that moving to greater use of performance and commercial specifications 
and standards is one of the most important actions that DoD must take to ensure we are able to 
meet our military, economic, and policy objectives in the future. Moreover, the Vice President's 
National Performance Review recommends that agencies avoid government-unique requirements 
and rely more on the commercial marketplace. 
 
To accomplish this objective, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) 
chartered a Process Action Team to develop a strategy and a specific plan of action to decrease 
reliance, to the maximum extent practicable, on military specifications and standards. The 
Process Action Team report, "Blueprint for Change," identifies the tasks necessary to achieve 
this objective. I wholeheartedly accept the Team's report and approve the report's primary 
recommendation to use performance and commercial specifications and standards in lieu of 
military specifications and standards, unless no practical alternative exists to meet the user's 
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needs. I also accept the report of the Industry Review Panel on Specifications and Standards and 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) to appropriately implement 
the Panel’s recommendations. 
 
I direct the addressees to take immediate action to implement the Team's recommendations and 
assign the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) overall implementation 
responsibility. I direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) to 
immediately arrange for reprogramming the funds needed in FY94 and FY95 to efficiently 
implement the recommendations. I direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the 
Directors of the Defense Agencies to program funding for FY96 and beyond in accordance with 
the Defense Planning Guidance. Policy Changes 
 
Listed below are a number of the most critical changes to current policy that are needed to 
implement the Process Action Team's recommendations. These changes are effective 
immediately. However, it is not my intent to disrupt on-going solicitations or contract 
negotiations. Therefore, the Component Acquisition Executive (as defined in Part 15 of DoD 
Instruction 5000.2), or a designee, may waive the implementation of these changes for on-going 
solicitations or contracts during the next 180 days following the date of this memorandum. The 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) shall implement these policy changes 
in DoD Instruction 5000.2, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS),and any other instructions, manuals, regulations, or policy documents, as appropriate. 
Military Specifications and Standards: Performance specifications shall be used when purchasing 
new systems, major modifications, upgrades to current systems, and non- developmental and 
commercial items, for programs in any acquisition category. If it is not practicable to use a 
performance specification, a non-government standard shall be used. Since there will be cases 
when military specifications are needed to define an exact design solution because there is no 
acceptable non-governmental standard or because the use of a performance specification or non-
government standard is not cost effective, the use of military specifications and standards is 
authorized as a last resort, with an appropriate waiver. 
 
Waivers for the use of military specifications and standards must be approved by the Milestone 
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Decision Authority (as defined in Part 2 of DoD Instruction 5000.2). In the case of acquisition 
category ID programs, waivers may be granted by the Component Acquisition Executive, or a 
designee. The Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion shall determine the specifications and 
standards to be used for naval nuclear propulsion plants in accordance with Pub. L. 98-525 (42 
U.S.C. '7158 note).Waivers for reprocurement of items already in the inventory are not required. 
Waivers may be made on a "class" or items basis for a period of time not to exceed two years. 
Innovative Contract Management: The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 
Technology) shall develop, within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) language to encourage contractors to propose non-
government standards and industry-wide practices that meet the intent of the military 
specifications and standards. The Under Secretary will make this language effective 180 days 
after the date of this memorandum. This language will be developed for inclusion in both 
requests for proposal and in on-going contracts. These standards and practices shall be 
considered as alternatives to those military specifications and standards cited in all new contracts 
expected to have a value of $100,000 or more, and in existing contracts of $500,000 or more 
having a substantial contract effort remaining to be performed. 
 
Pending completion of the language, I encourage the Secretaries of the Military Departments and 
the Directors of the Defense Agencies to exercise their existing authority to use solicitation and 
contract clause language such as the language proposed in the Process Action Team's report. 
Government contracting officers shall expedite the processing of proposed alternatives to 
military specifications and standards and are encouraged to use the Value Engineering no-cost 
settlement method (permitted by FAR 48.104-3) in existing contracts. 
 
Program Use of Specifications and Standards: Use of specifications and standards listed in DoD 
Instruction 5000.2 is not mandatory for Program Managers. These specifications and standards 
are tools available to the Program Manager, who shall view them as guidance, as stated in 
Section 6-Q of DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
 
Tiering of Specification and Standards: During production, those system specifications, 
subsystem specifications and equipment/product specifications (through and including the first-
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tier reference in the equipment/product specifications) cited in the contract shall be mandatory 
for use. Lower tier references will be for guidance only, and will not be contractually binding 
unless they are directly cited in the contract. Specifications and standards listed on engineering 
drawings are to be considered as first-tier references. Approval of exceptions to this policy may 
only be made by the Head of the Departmental or Agency Standards Improvement Office and the 
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion for specifications and drawings used in nuclear propulsion 
plants in accordance with Pub. L. 98-525 (42 U.S.C. '7158 Note). 
 
New Directions 
Management and Manufacturing Specifications and Standards: Program Managers shall use 
management and manufacturing specifications and standards for guidance only. The Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)shall develop a plan for canceling these 
specifications and standards, inactivating them for new designs, transferring the specifications 
and standards to non-government standards, converting them to performance-based 
specifications, or justifying their retention as military specifications and standards. The plan shall 
begin with the ten management and manufacturing standards identified in the Report of the 
Industry Review Panel on Specifications and Standards and shall require completion of the 
appropriate action, to the maximum extent practicable, within two years. 
 
Configuration Control: To the extent practicable, the Government should maintain configuration 
control of the functional and performance requirements only, giving- contractors responsibility 
for the detailed design. 
 
Obsolete Specifications: The "Department of Defense Index of Specifications and Standards" 
and the "Acquisition Management System and Data Requirements Control List" contain outdated 
military specifications and standards and data requirements that should not be used for new 
development efforts. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) shall 
develop a procedure for identifying and removing these obsolete requirements. 
 
Use of Non-Government Standards: I encourage the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition 
and Technology) to form partnerships with industry associations to develop non-government 
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standards for replacement of military standards where practicable. The Under Secretary shall 
adopt and list in the "Department of Defense Index of Specifications and Standards"(DoDISS) 
non-government standards currently being used by DoD. The Under Secretary shall also 
establish teams to review the federal supply classes and standardization areas to identify 
candidates for conversion or replacement. 
 
Reducing Oversight: I direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the 
Defense Agencies to reduce direct Government oversight by substituting process controls and 
non-government standards in place of development and/or production testing and inspection and 
military-unique quality assurance systems. 
 
Cultural Changes 
Challenge Acquisition Requirements: Program Managers and acquisition decision makers at all 
levels shall challenge requirements because the problem of unique military systems does not 
begin with the standards. The problem is rooted in the requirements determination phase of the 
acquisition cycle. 
 
Enhance Pollution Controls: The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the 
Defense Agencies shall establish and execute an aggressive program to identify and reduce or 
eliminate toxic pollutants procured or generated through the use of specifications and standards. 
Education and Training: The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) shall 
ensure that training and education programs throughout the Department are revised to 
incorporate specifications and standards reform. 
 
Program Reviews: Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) review of programs at all levels shall 
include consideration of the extent streamlining, both in the contract and in the oversight process, 
is being pursued. The MDA (i.e., the Component Acquisition Executive or his/her designee, for 
all but ACAT 1D programs) will be responsible for ensuring that progress is being made with 
respect to programs under his/her cognizance. 
 
Standards Improvement Executives: The Under Secretary the Secretaries of the Military 
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Departments, and the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency shall appoint Standards 
Improvement Executives within 30 days. The Standards Improvement Executives shall assume 
the responsibilities of the current Standardization Executives, support those carrying out 
acquisition reform, direct implementation of the military specifications and standards reform 
program, and participate on the Defense Standards Improvement Council. The Defense 
Standards Improvement Council shall be the primary coordinating body for the specification and 
standards program within the Department of Defense and shall report directly to the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Economic Security). The Council shall coordinate with the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) regarding specification and standards reform matters, 
and shall provide periodic progress reports to the Acquisition Reform Senior Steering Group, 
who will monitor overall implementation progress. 
 
Management Commitment 
This Process Action Team tackled one of the most difficult issues we will face in reforming the 
acquisition process. I would like to commend the team, composed of representatives from all of 
the Military Departments and appropriate Defense Agencies, and its leader, Mr. Darold Griffin, 
for a job well done. In addition, I would like to thank the Army, and in particular, Army Materiel 
Command, for its administrative support of the team. 
 
The Process Action Team's report and the policies contained in this memorandum are not a total 
solution to the problems inherent in the use of military specifications and standards; however, 
they are a solid beginning that will increase the use of performance and commercial 
specifications and standards. Your leadership and good judgment will be critical to successful 
implementation of this reform. I encourage you and your leadership teams to be active 
participants in establishing the environment essential for implementing this cultural change. 
This memorandum is intended only to improve the internal management of the Department of 
Defense and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or 
equity by a party against the Department of Defense or its officers and employees. 
//signed// 
William J. Perry  
 97 
Acknowledgements 
This research was partially sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School, and we are especially 
grateful for the support and encouragement provided by Rear Admiral Jim Greene (USN, Ret.) 
and Keith Snider. We want to thank all of the companies, industry associations, and experts who 
provided input into this study.  Finally, we want to thank Jaiyi Li, a student graduate research 
assistant, for her research support; Susan Tonner, a long-time acquisition policy professional, 
who provided research, analytical, and editing support; and Caroline Dawn Pulliam for her 




About the Authors 
 
Jacques S. Gansler 
The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, is a professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy 
and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland; he is also the 
Director of the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise.  As the third-ranking civilian at 
the Pentagon from 1997–2001, Dr. Gansler was responsible for all research and development, 
acquisition reform, logistics, advance technology, environmental security, defense industry, and 
numerous other security programs.  Before joining the Clinton administration, Dr. Gansler held a 
variety of positions in government and the private sector, including Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Material Acquisition), Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
(Electronics), senior vice president at TASC, Vice President of ITT, and engineering and 
management positions with Singer and Raytheon Corporations. 
Throughout his career, Dr. Gansler has written, published, testified, and taught on subjects 
related to his work.  He is the author of five books and over 100 articles.  His most recent book is 
Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a 21st Century Defense Industry (MIT Press, 2011).  
In 2007, Dr. Gansler served as the chair of the Secretary of the Army’s Commission on 
Contracting and Program Management for Army Expeditionary Forces.  He is a member of the 
Defense Science Board and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Advisory Board.  He 
is also a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the National Academy 
of Public Administration.  Additionally, he is the Glenn L. Martin Institute Fellow of 
Engineering at the A. James Clarke School of Engineering; an affiliate faculty member at the 
Robert H. Smith School of Business; and a senior fellow at the James MacGregor Burns 
Academy of Leadership (all at the University of Maryland).  From 2003–2004, he served as 
Interim Dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, and from 2004–2006, 
Dr. Gansler served as the Vice President for Research at the University of Maryland. 
 99 
William C. Greenwalt 
 
William Greenwalt is a visiting fellow at the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he is working on defense and aerospace acquisition 
issues and industrial base policy. 
 
Mr. Greenwalt has broad-ranging experience in the field and has served in senior positions at the 
Pentagon, in Congress, and in the defense industry. As Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Industrial Policy, he advised the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics on all matters relating to the defense industrial base. In Congress, he served as Deputy 
Director for the Surveys and Investigations staff of the House Appropriations Committee, as well 
as a professional staff member for the Senate Armed Services and Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committees. As a Senate staff member, Greenwalt’s work on reforms of management and 
acquisition practices led to the Clinger–Cohen Act of 1996. Mr. Greenwalt has also worked for 
Lockheed Martin as Director of Federal Acquisition Policy. Immediately before joining AEI, he 
was Vice President of Acquisition Policy at the Aerospace Industries Association where he 
developed and coordinated the aerospace industry position on a variety of related issues. 
William Lucyshyn 
William Lucyshyn is the Director of Research and a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for 
Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of 
Maryland. In this position, he directs research on critical policy issues related to the increasingly 
complex problems associated with improving public-sector management and operations and with 
how government works with private enterprise. 
His current projects include modernizing government supply-chain management, identifying 
government sourcing and acquisition best practices, and analyzing Department of Defense 
business modernization and transformation. Previously, Mr. Lucyshyn served as a Program 
Manager and the Principal Technical Advisor to the Director of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) on the identification, selection, research, development, and prototype 
production of advanced technology projects. 
 100 
Prior to joining DARPA, Mr. Lucyshyn completed a 25-year career in the U.S. Air Force. Mr. 
Lucyshyn received his bachelor’s degree in engineering science from the City University of New 
York and earned his master’s degree in nuclear engineering from the Air Force Institute of 
Technology. He has authored numerous reports, book chapters, and journal articles.
The Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise provides the strategic linkage between the public and private sector to develop and 
improve solutions to increasingly complex problems associated with the delivery of public services — a responsibility increasingly shared 
by both sectors. Operating at the nexus of public and private interests, the Center researches, develops, and promotes best practices; 
develops policy recommendations; and strives to influence senior decision-makers toward improved government and industry results. 








A R Y L A N
D
